A good post, but I think you should focus more on the nature of States. Specifically, they are not mere "select groups" or "mere provinces or political corporations" (MA v. EPA, Alden v. Maine) but rather pre-existing countries" -- they retain "the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty. "

The distinction between Rights v. Powers is a real one. For instance, States have the right to act as Parens Patriae (Father of the People), but do not have the power to invade other States to enforce such a right. (Rather, the federal Courts must give special consideration to States suits emanating from such a Right.)

IX and X make no sense if one tries to set them against each other. But of course, they were designed to set against the Federal government. Together they are rules for reading the Federal powers narrowly.

"the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty. "

--makes no sense. It's a pretty way of saying nothing. I do think that a fuller exploration of what "state" means, past and present, vis-a-vis the U.S. is very important; but given the context as well as the text of the formulation of the U.S. Constitution, the overwhelming focus on individuals rather than any collective as an entity disembodied, or beyond a consideration of individuals (yet, "sovereign"?), makes the "states rights" argument very tenuous. The whole point of a state having powers, then and now, was to better secure to individuals the powers to govern themselves. I hardly think that the Founders and Framers (some of whom were both) would be happy with tyrannical state governments as long as some ethereal federal government was formed by the collective will expressed through individualist voting.

I hardly think that the Founders and Framers (some of whom were both) would be happy with tyrannical state governments as long as some ethereal federal government was formed by the collective will expressed through individualist voting.

Strange, as that was close to the form of government of many states until the mid-19th century, with the invention of substantive due process in Dred Scott v. Sanford and the the reconstruction amendments.

The Supreme Court has ruled, again and again, that States are not creatures of the Federal Government but pre-existant of the Federal Government. This is another way of saying that the United States is an economic and political union of member-states.

If you disagree, you are free to look for the doctrine of judicial review in the Constitution, or the necessity of a federal judicial protection against the powers of the States in the Federalist Papers.

"The Supreme Court has ruled, again and again, that States are not creatures of the Federal Government but pre-existant of the Federal Government. This is another way of saying that the United States is an economic and political union of member-states."

Pre-existence is irrelevant, since the formation of the U.S. and the Constitution binding all together altered their pre-existent state. Otherwise, they'd not need a federal government nor a common Constitution.

I.e., look at it from the perspective of adaptation and evolution. Their sovereign nature, whatever it might have been, was altered by signing the dotted line and joining the Union. This is why the "dignity...without full authority" description is so strange and fairly meaningless, unless the only definitional characteristic of sovereign states is dignity (a subjective evaluation) and not whatsoever full authority over its own capacity to utilize power -- or, unless the definitional characteristic of a sovereign state is that it is not sovereign, really:

--sov·er·eign adj. Abbr. sov. 1. Self-governing; independent: a sovereign state. 2. Having supreme rank or power: a sovereign prince. 3. Paramount; supreme: her sovereign virtue is compassion. 4.a. Of superlative strength or efficacy: a sovereign remedy. b. Unmitigated: sovereign contempt.

[American Heritage Dictionary, electronic version]

Curtis,

It may help you to read MA v. EPA, or my original blog post on the matter, as it may help you understand "dignity without full authority.' As it is, I am not sure if you are arguing in ignorance of the Court's record on the matter, or in opposition to it.

Dan,

What is the Court's record, vis-a-vis Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas?

From Lawrence:

In his dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens concluded that (1) the fact a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process. That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby overruled.

I.e., in your terminology, if I am an adult (as considered within the corpus of the law of the land) able to consent (again, vis-a-vis the law), I shall have no Father but my natural biological or legally adoptive father, and he shall not have dominion over me. I am a sovereign individual.

A lot of fancy footwork, btw:

"The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting here. The State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.[1] In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air."

Just as Georgia's "independent interest ... in all the earth and air within its domain" supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory [2] today. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999) (observing that in the federal system, the States "are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty" [3]). That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the "territory alleged to be affected" only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power.

When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives [4]. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 607 (1982) ("One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue parens patriae [5] is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers").

These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing standards applicable to the "emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." [6] 42 U. S. C. §7521(a)(1). Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious [7]. §7607(b)(1). Given that procedural right [8] and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign[9] interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.

[1] & [2] Note that Justice Stevens makes use of a citation from Justice Holmes [1907] to support his argument, but the quasi-sovereign nature -- italics on quasi- actually carried over by Stevens -- later becomes the "sovereign" that you have made the full point of the argument? This is dissimulation, the attempt to make a prior concept into something else by dropping the qualifier; to make the skew complete, the phrase "the dignity...of sovereignty" [3] -- which is meaningless, per my previous comment -- is transcribed from a rulling 92 years after the quasi-sovereignty is declared in a ruling.

Note again, in case it slipped, my mention of adaptation, or that joining the Union altered the sovereign nature that was pre-existent; because here Stevens admits as much. [4]

One might also argue that parens patriae only has meaning if a people pre-exist; i.e., individuals must be harmed. [5] Although Stevens is taking great pains to also argue that the State as an entity separate from the people has a quasi-sovereignty -- er, sovereignty? dignity/metaphoric-style sovereignty? --that gives it the right to protect its territory [2] -- note the italics I have used on that word -- the argument from parens patriae is one that presupposes a pre-existent people.

Finally, note that the right to sue does not come solely from any sort of actual status as a sovereign-but-joined-in-union status. No, the Congress, which is a federal institution, made it possible, according to Stevens' argument. [6] [7] [8] This consideration does not match up well with the gist of your argument that "States are not creatures of the Federal Government but pre-existant of the Federal Government." Well, they were pre-existent, to be sure; but even as Stevens himself finally declares, in a summation of this branch of the argument -- after considering the skewed concept of sovereignty and then the role of the Congress in this case (not to mention the pre-existent individual citizens of Massachusetts) -- they have only quasi-sovereignty. [9] So he reverts to the initial characterization for clarity, although a "States Righter" might miss that fact. ;)