We Observe, We Orient, We Decide/Act

It’s just that cause and effect are omnipresent, the World is complex, and Observations — whether concrete or abstract — are going to be limited, stretching from the past through the present and into the future.  Thus, reason is limited.

[CGW, Phatic Communion, “EBO is Everything in War — Almost”]

Thus, our conscious Acts are shaped by our reasoning, which in turn has been limited by our Observation of the World — or, more to the point, by our concrete ability to observe the world.  Our acts and decisions will always be limited by what we observe and may observe, and thus are shaped by the concrete reality of the world, of which our own physical reality — our genetic heritage — is only part.

Dan of tdaxp has previously utilized John Boyd’s OODA Loop to gain a better understanding of William Lind’s framework for the generations of warfare, in a post called “Go Deep (OODA and the Rainbow of Generational Warfare).”  In that post, Dan considered primarily the part of the abstract, or subjective, cognitive process most targeted by each generation of warfare, shown here in an image modeled on his but using a closer approximation to Boyd’s Loop:


Dan’s theory is that each succeeding generation of warfare represents a focus “deeper” into the enemy’s OODA decision-making process:

1GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to decide and act….

2GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to orient and decide….

3GW is defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to orient….

4GW is defined by conflict centered around Observe and Orient….

[Dan, tdaxp, “Go Deep”]

Technological and observational capabilities predetermined what could be accomplished on the battlefield. William Lind addressed the technological factors in “The Changing Face of War:  Into the Fourth Generation”:

First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc….

Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear….Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Massed firepower replaced massed manpower….Technological factors included von Moltke’s realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph….

Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower….Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics…. the addition of a new technological element—tanks—brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart’s indirect approach) to time….

[Lind, “The Changing Face of War” emphasis added.]

In that 1989 essay, Lind also postulated technology-driven 4th Generation War.  4GW might operate through increased “direct energy” to directly destroy small targets behind enemy lines or within societies, through robotics and remote-piloted vehicles giving warriors greater access to the enemy, and through the increased reach of media — which Lind uses to postulate an idea-driven 4GW.

Dan of tdaxp, in explaining his determination of where on the simple OODA each generation of warfare sought to “attack” an enemy’s decision-making process, also included brief considerations  of the observational capabilities of both attacker and target:

[1GW]  Information was relatively symmetrical — precise locations of either army were unavailable to any commander, while general knowledge of the land was known to all commanders….

[2GW] You know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly where you are going to die (in the razorwire and minefield, hit by enemy crossfire). Thanks to telegraphs and modern communications, commanders are flooded with a tsunami of almost meaningless facts. Thinking now centers around where and when it makes sense to try to break through, as well as the how to move to advance evenly….

[3GW] Victory in 3rd Generation Wars required the ability to instill madness — to mess with the enemy’s minds….  [ed. — i.e., not only knowing roughly where you and the enemy are, but knowing the enemy’s orientation beyond the simple bi-polar trench-line or strict front warfare, or knowing nodes and connections between individual units and battle placements, and being able to insert oneself quickly amidst that orientation via “blitzkrieg” maneuvers.]

[4GW] If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads [ed. — observes, among other things] everywhere  yet regular armies have a hard time even finding battles….

[5GW] A 5th Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever was a war.

[Dan, tdaxp, ibid.]

Unfortunately, Dan’s consideration of these factors is rather brief in that linked post, as are Lind’s considerations (in his linked essay) of the effect of technology on the generations of warfare.  As mentioned at the beginning of this section, our conscious Acts are shaped by our reasoning, which in turn has been limited by our Observation of the World, and I would like a closer look at the way observational capabilities have altered effects-based approaches over time.

While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability — reconnaissance capability — than Dan’s brief assessment allows, one’s own scouts or the spies in an enemy’s encampment would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report.  In the first place, their reports would have been old news by the time they were received by one’s generals — perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity; perhaps days old if movement from the enemy forces to one’s own force (to report) required days.  Individual movements on the battlefield once battle had commenced would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-man, making the scout relatively useless.  Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still be targeted, and targeting elements behind the enemy lines — or beyond the range of those weapons — would have been relatively useless.  In the case of limited long-range capabilities, the targeting mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough if the cannonball or shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line.

2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range communications, and rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach. Primitive air forces also increased, and sped up, observational capabilities.  Greater fire power in artillery and aerial bombings meant that one could more accurately target more enemies whenever one used these things (unlike, say, a cannonball in the previous generation that might have hit nothing when it fell or only one or a handful of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually helped limit the need to know an exact enemy placement.)

3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities — a necessary improvement if one is to know where one’s enemy is, exactly, and how that enemy’s forces and strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most effectively to disrupt and overcome that enemy’s defenses.  Again, improved air forces, communications technologies, transportation, and firepower improved one’s observational range and speed.  Keeping one’s own forces in contact, and operating efficiently and not at cross-purposes, also required quicker communications and observational capabilities.

4GW continues the trend.  The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors even as I type this.  Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and the net of media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data, increasing observational capability.  Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists are often quite separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society, but they have yet to infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies’ forces; i.e., be among those forces without being detected.  (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi defense forces has somewhat occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi government has also occurred at some level.  But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces or government?  Unlikely, although the theft of databases — such as the recently-stolen armed forces personnel database — and intercept communications might give 4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S. operations.  Or else, the New York Times will boldly publish details of those operations.)

5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as I’ve theorized on Phatic Communion, might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently available to 4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a society’s armed forces, and a society’s institutions and government, or else open communication of intentions from proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that they are being so used.

Furthermore, a consideration of these generations of warfare should not forget to look at the way other aspects of society beyond technology have developed across the years.  For instance, at a time when many societies were organized on the basis of land-ownership rather than interstate commerce and trade, they tended to be insular (as well as self-sufficient), and an individual stranger was more quickly identified by differences in physical appearance and language, while an enemy state’s operations were occluded by distance and their own insularity. As interconnectivity has increased, flows of information have increased in number; but while these increased flows of information have improved observational capabilities vis-a-vis enemy state activity, they have also multiplied factors to be considered, creating a complexity that may blind us, particularly when trying to distinguish individual enemy operatives.  (That last may be applied particularly to the theory of 5GW, but these considerations may also touch significantly upon 4GW and even 3GW tactics.)

In each of these cases, a force’s ability to observe its opponent enables or disables types of action available to that force, by allowing or disallowing a more complete and accurate orientation in relationship to that enemy and, thus, better decision-making ability. 

Because greater observational capability may lead to successful “deeper” actions against an enemy, that enemy may be forced to adjust his decision-making process in reaction to those “deeper” acts.  Essentially:

• The nearer one strikes at one’s enemy, particularly with successive acts during war — via a physical alteration of the concrete world — the more immediate, numerous, various, and defined the observations that enemy has of one’s actions.


• The deeper into enemy territory we go, the less that enemy has to observe more deeply into our territory to see what we are doing; in fact, a focus on the present near activity may limit that enemy’s ability to observe further into our territory if he is preoccupied with reacting to what we are doing.
  

Both of these factors shape an enemy’s decision-making process.  By broadening the field of battle, including deeper into enemy territory — as a result of broader observational capabilities — each succeeding generation of warriors forced their enemies to broaden their own observational activity and thus affected their decision-making processes by the multiplication of factors to be considered.  This, I think, is the reasoning behind Dan’s diagram of these generations and the OODA loop.

Going Deeper into OODA

I.e.,

• 1GW could only operate on the basis of a shared, symmetrical concrete plane, including roughly symmetrical technology but also including the lay-of-land.  Maneuvering on the basis of an enemy’s organization would have been severely limited simply because the ability to observe that enemy’s organization was severely limited as a battle occurred — so keeping a formation together and moving together became very important for ruling out whatever moves were available to the enemy.  The enemy had to attack that formation while ruling out the same thing by doing the same things. Geography was utilized as much as possible, in advance, to improve whatever observational advantage one could devise; but when battle occurred, it was man-to-man, and changing the physical environment — particularly, the physical beings of the enemy host; i.e., killing as many as possible — was the primary strategy.  Because either side of two 1GW forces would operate mostly on the basis of the unfolding physical environment, either only had to judge that physical environment when making a decision.  Thus, one attempted to affect most directly the enemy’s process of deciding actions by altering that physical environment — especially, by taking initiative to change it first and, if possible, most.
  


• 2GW operated similarly, but increased communications ability via the telegraph and railroads, etc., allowed one to know better at any given time the direction of an enemy’s approach, an enemy’s location, and so forth.  Improved observational ability gave one the option of where to attack:  a 2GW force need not hit the enemy all at once on the same plane of activity, nor defend all at once, like 1GW forces,  but could focus defenses where needed and assault the enemy where it would be most beneficial.  Two 2GW forces, then, would tend to form stable fronts of concentrated force while trying to exploit weakness where they were observed.  Because greater firepower could quickly decimate forces where they were weakest in their defenses, movement became more limited than 1GW, more cautious, and this led to developments like trench warfare.  Initiative was gained by observing a weakness first and exploiting it before the enemy could strengthen his defenses; by doing so, a 2GW force would turn his enemy’s observation to that point on the line.  Or else, the 2GW force sought initiative by overburdening the foe’s resources through successive strikes along the line of defense.  In effect, successive strikes were direct strikes against an enemy’s ability to decide.  By altering the number of factors to be considered for any decision — by changing the concrete environment in multiple places, in multiple ways — the 2GW force produced many different potential decisions, and a foe could be forced to weaken other areas as he strengthened some in reaction. On the diagram above, this effect is shown between Orient and Decide.


• 3GW utilized this process of multiplication of factors to be considered, because the 3GW force itself was able to consider multiple factors in order to strike in the most beneficial way.  Improved observational ability (and thus, planning ability) suggested ways of striking where the foe was weakest and in a way the foe had not fully anticipated, and improved technology made such strikes possible.  The 3GW force knew its moves were not fully anticipated.  Thus, when the foe was hit, the foe would be forced into an attempt to orient to the sudden new information.  3GW was much quicker than 2GW, less cautious with defense and more audacious in attack; it had to be, or else the enemy might observe a 3GW force’s actions toward it and orient to defend (Act) against those actions.  The foe would see it happen as it happened, but because it happened more quickly than his previous experience of warfare could allow him to anticipate, he would have difficulty settling into a corresponding understanding of what was needed to defend against it.  Whatever decision he made would be too late.  By driving deeper into enemy territory, in force, the 3GW attacker also forced the enemy to observe sudden new information in rapid, near, and various quantities, and thus attacked the enemy’s decision-making ability primarily on Orient.


• 4GW forces are typically already among their foes.  Wars against occupation which are fought by 4GW forces are a good example.  But as interconnectivity between societies increases, the ability to be among foes also increases; the process of globalization means an increasing single plane of activity.  “Being among” represents not only physical proximity, but also observational ability and, thus, the ability to act, for the 4GW force, on many levels. And because these forces are typically among their foes, they can confuse their enemies’ ability to separate cause and effect, foe and friend, actions committed by the 4GW forces and those committed by the target of 4GW.  If a 4GW force kills lots of civilians and then quickly hides among other civilians, the demarcation between 4GW force and the populace of a nation becomes blurred for the ultimate target of 4GW — i.e., the observer outside that force — who may commit acts which may be inseparable from those of the 4GW force, in the minds of other observers and even of themselves.  As Dan of tdaxp explained it, “Like 3rd Generation Wars, 4th Generation Wars focus on the picture inside the enemy’s head. But while 3GW tries to destroy the picture, 4GW builds a new one.”  By attacking a target’s ability to Orient, a 3GW force impedes decision and action in its target, but a 4GW force wants to force an orientation of its liking and wants its target to decide and act — but in the manner of the 4GW force’s choosing.  This is accomplished by feeding information into its target while limiting the influence or significance of other information:  the 4GW force kills or destroys, but then hides again or in fact becomes “just another part of the populace.”   This role affecting what moves between Observation and Orient is shown in the above diagram.  Since 4GW forces are seen but as apparitions, and yet their actions are known to be 4GW actions, their influence may seem unstoppable for the observer, and they may ultimately weaken the desire to wrest control of the OODA back from them (i.e., morale.) through the impossibility of finding them and destroying them.
  


• 5GW, as implied in the diagram, is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know that the 5GW force exists.  When the target makes any decision, the target believes it is in full command of its decision-making ability.  The 5GW force merely creates information in relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes all information available and continues on his way toward making a decision and acting.  Selective information creation will be the 5GW force’s modus operandi, and the 5GW force’s goal is to have the target act on that information.  The 5GW force will have an action or set of actions in mind before it decides what information will be created for the target of its efforts.  Thus, the 5GW force acts primarily on its enemy’s ability to Observe.
  

Alas, going deeper into the enemy’s OODA must be achieved via physical acts, because psychic abilities do not exist.  I.e., we cannot really act directly upon an enemy’s abstract processes, but are confined to the creation of new information by altering the concrete world being observed by the enemy — and must contend with the information that enemy possessed before we act.  We must also contend with multiple sources of information within the concrete world over which we have little ability to shape — in fact, may have little ability to observe directly — whenever we attempt to affect an enemy’s decision-making process.  But as outlined at the top of this post and in Part Two of this series, that’s exactly what we must do if complete and utter destruction of our enemies is out of the question or beyond our ability: EBO.   But different effects will require different operational styles.  And, even the same effects in a changing World may ultimately require new limits or new directions for operational choices; by altering what — and how — we observe in that World, that changing World may give birth to new operational approaches.

And Deeper……

I began this series of posts because I was not comfortable with the OODA loop as presented by John Boyd.  Primarily, I did not like the fact that the Orient phase was written mystically, or as a magic cloud:



— as if genetic heritage, cultural traditions, and new information originated in the Orient phase of the decision-making process, a phase that seemed to represent entirely an abstract process.  This, combined with fuzzy feedback loops and “implicit guidance and control loops” (as in the images above this image of Orient), blurred the distinction between concrete reality and what we make of that concrete reality when we witness it.  So I revised the loop to account for the influences of both, the concrete and the abstract, by separating them and yet joining them as two concurrent processes.

I’ve looked deeper into the subject of EBO — in “EBO is Everything in War — Almost” — to better come to grips with how, indeed, we may act in warfare to create beneficial effects.  And, I’ve found limits to EBO, which I’ve outlined in more detail at the beginning of this post.

Essentially, causes and reasons are two separate things, although colloquially we tend to equate them.  But though different, they bear a relation to one another.  To say that any action we may commit in warfare can cause a person to decide and act a certain way may miss the distinction between cause and reason — some other subjective thought, or more likely many thoughts, about the present concrete environment or even a past concrete environment, could well be the primary foundation upon which an enemy chooses to act — but nonetheless, we reason from the concrete.  If we change the concrete world, our enemy may well be forced to reason from it, if only partly from it.

We can view an enemy’s Acts to get a better, perhaps more objective, understanding of that enemy’s abstract processes. Human acts are the physical manifestations of these abstract processes. To the degree that we can form a true understanding of an enemy’s abstract processes, we may present him with information likely to run the course of his abstract processing in ways that will lead to beneficial acts — beneficial to us.

But even given the possibility that we can somewhat objectively come to understand an enemy’s thought processes, the World is complex, with much information feeding into our own and our enemy’s Abstract OODA beyond our direct control.  The World has always been complex, but we are only now, in modern times, beginning to appreciate the level of complexity.  In my second post in this series, I commented on a contemporary superstitious belief in metaphysical acts by referencing

the superstitious theory that we are all somehow “connected” via a “network” and able to act upon each other metaphysically or outside the realm of physics… [CGW]

and although I stand by the description, I recognize the difficulty inherent in assessing the current shape of human affairs in toto.  We speak of such complexity in the shorthand when we refer to “networks” — but it is a shorthand with some basis in concrete fact, I am sure.   If cause and effect are indeed omnipresent in the concrete world — another claim from that post — then everything might truly be connected, perhaps in multiple ways and through mulitple chains of relation but affecting everything else in a very concrete manner.  I’m just not able to suggest with sincerity that human beings are able to consciously affect everything or even anything through the same all-connecting tissue.  (Except, we tend to connect everything we observe abstractly by finding a place for each thing in our general world-view.)  Plus, the omnipresence of cause and effect, in combination with the complexity of the concrete World, may well mean that our physical acts, though minutely directed or focused on only part of the world, change parts of the concrete world we are as yet incapable of seeing in any present situation:  that is the Butterfly Effect so commonly touted.

Given these considerations, and notwithstanding the perhaps futile process of simplifying the complexity to gain a better understanding of complex human interactions, I’ve attempted to overlay the “generations of warfare” onto the Revised OODA presented in Part One of this series:




Some notes on this diagram:

• First to be considered:  Each generation, 1 through 5, actually affects the enemy through physical acts.  These acts change the concrete world, but perhaps in different ways, thus offering different types of information, or different types of sets of information, for the enemy’s consideration.


• ”Enemy OODA Target,” then, merely means the intended portion of the enemy’s OODA to be most affected by our methods of concrete manipulation of the World.  Because everything in the OODA feeds from information of the concrete world, every part of the OODA will be influenced by our every action in manipulating, or changing, that world; but certain portions of the enemy’s decision-making process will be where we plan the greatest influence.


• ”Desired Information Flow” merely points at the subprocesses we intend to utilize — or, more accurately,  to be utilized — once we have created new information for the enemy.


• Although I have not made the point before:  The Conditional Constructs and Mental Constructs can occur simultaneously, but either one or both together represent the state of orientation at any given moment.  To say that actions flow from either is merely to say that actions flow from the state of orientation. And, each of the three loosely-name types of action is drawn from the type of construct most dominant at the time of action.


• Each of the generational Enemy OODA Targets [EOT] is placed roughly where they were placed by Dan of tdaxp in his model, and for roughly the same reasons given in my contemplation of that model, above.


• The biggest exception in EOT placement is that for 1GW. I took my cue from Lind’s essay,

  Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon.   [“The Changing Face of War”]

  and from the consideration, outlined above, that 1GW attempted to affect the enemy’s decision-making process primarily by destroying that enemy, or by altering the physical environment, without as much consideration for the abstract processes of that enemy.  To change the World was the attempt at forcing a decision and an action — surrender or retreat, etc. — but this is still not the type of utter destruction of all enemy units that would be beyond the scope of EBO.


• The other slight exception in EOT placement would be for the next generation, 2GW.  John Boyd’s OODA, as stated multiple times, blurred lines between the abstract and the concrete; but I’ve attempted to separate them.  While very concerned with altering the physical environment, 2GW specifically sought initiative by trying to overburden an enemy’s Abstract Decision.  Ideally, the Abstract Act that would follow would be, “I must surrender!” but it could also be the weakening of one point in the front as the target attempted to strengthen another.  Multiple choices were not so various and immediate as offered by the later 3GW, so the 2GW could orient — relatively static fronts helped — but upon analysis of the situation the target of 2GW would have to decide between options, and the 2GW force would hope the decision led directly to the Abstract Act of an understanding.  (Greater hypotheses and reviewing of decisions might lead to an undesirable understanding, or an understanding beneficial to the target, not the 2GW force.)


• 3GW is really the oddball of the five, from one perspective.  A quick succession of acts deeper into enemy territory produces too much new data (relative to past experiences) for any Abstract Decision-Abstract Act to occur.  As Dan said, a 3GW tries to destroy the “image” in his foe’s mind.  The result is either a constant looping from Abstract Decision(Hypothesis) - Conditional Construct - Abstract Observation — i.e., paralysis — or into an impulsive act based on Conditional Constructs (or images produced primarily by that new data, chaotic and a bit incoherent, unsettled).  Incidentally, anyone who has read John Robb’s theories about Global Guerrillas ought to recognize how this consideration of 3GW does, in fact, seem to describe what he has postulated for those GG’s. (Although, there’s still some doubt to be offered on that possibility.)


• 4GW and 5GW greatly differ from the other three in the abstract processes an attacker wishes the target to utilize when making a decision.  Both approaches tend to operate over a longer time frame than 1GW, 2GW, and 3GW, vis-a-vis an enemy’s cognition loop relative to any given actions.  Thus, each attempts to influence the enemy to form Mental Constructs in line with the 4GW message or 5GW paradigm, to be utilized by the target when analyzing or synthesizing future new information.  This is a kind of attrition directed toward an enemy’s thought processes, and is represented by the Information Flow back to Abstract Observe from Mental Constructs.  1GW and 2GW plan for the enemy to come to a specific understanding, as well; and, any future Abstract Observation will be influenced by that understanding; but either of those approaches depends more on a heavy influence by new data and less on the influence of abstract data, or Old Information, in their approach.  4GW and 5GW, however, are not likely to be approaches made successful merely through the application of great force, or great and widespread manipulation of the physical world.
  


• Incidentally, another significant note: Any of the three types of action may occur during any war, regardless of the generational tactics being employed; but, like the Enemy OODA Target, the type of Acts being marked are the intended primary acts one wants an enemy to make.  For instance, Impulsive Acts committed by an enemy are almost always going to be beneficial to the attacker.  It’s just that 3GW is an operational style which depends more on that type of act — if paralysis isn’t achieved — than any of the others. (For one thing, 3GW cannot risk an enemy’s being able to decide on a course of action that would severely infiltrate the 3GW’s home territory while the 3GW force is making its audacious moves about the map….)


• Thus, all generational approaches besides 3GW would primarily seek a Focused Act committed by an enemy, through a Choice-Act  — just one that is influenced by the attacker and to the attacker’s benefit ….


• …except for 4GW and 5GW, which would also seek Habitual or Reflexive Acts.   Remember, in Part One, the description of such Acts: 

  In fact, we will likely find that habitual acts tend to occur most often when quite familiar situations occur frequently; i.e., when physical Observation of the World quickly matches up with whatever Mental Constructs we have previously formed — and, thus, not requiring further contemplation or hypotheses.

  The process of “helping” an enemy to form particular understandings of the world would lull the enemy into repetitive thought processes greatly informed by those Mental Constructs, and thus into reflexive or habitual acts.  1GW and 2GW, because they depend more on changed New Information for influencing an enemy’s decision-making process (and less on “operational art” — as termed by Lind — if at all) do not focus as much attention on the creation of repetitive thought processes.

By George, That’s It!

Well, probably not it, but it for now.  This post may undergo revisions — annotated — to fill in blanks and perhaps clarify a few things:  After about 14 hours, I think it’s time to hit “Publish!” even if I have spelling errors or garbled syntax.

Three last notes.

First, although I believe that 3GW still has great utility — technological advances may easily allow a force to impede a foe’s ability to Decide (and thus, to act in any way but impulsively) — the ability of any future 4GW or 5GW attacker to strike deeply into a 3GWarrior’s homeland may be quite significant, given the processes of globalization well under way.  John Robb’s Global Guerrilla theory may or may not be 3GW; if 3GW, it is merely the GG’s ability to strike deeply and quickly, confusing enemies by overloading Orient, on a scale unlike anything we’ve yet seen from 3GW.  Technological advances developed for use by individual operatives, such as nanotechnology or even new uses for biological, chemical, or nuclear warfare on such a localized scale, may make GG’s or their equivalents the epitome of quick-moving 3GW forces able to paralyze a foe. (“3GW infantry forces”.)   4GW forces and even 5GW forces may also be able to use these technologies to strike deeply and quickly into a typical 3GW state’s homeland.  I’m less sure that a 3GW state will be able or even likely to attack another 3GW state effectively, save though a much superior technological advantage:  too much observational ability on either side, with no clear advantage.  Too much chance for mutual destruction.

Second:  Technological advances may actually threaten war outside the realm of EBO.  Complete and utter destruction of all entities in the enemy host may well be possible, if not quite now then in the future.  Anything other than such destruction is likely to fit within a 3GW, 4GW, or 5GW framework.  1GW and 2GW really do seem to be things of the past, save for isolated and quite localized pockets in underdeveloped regions.

Third:  There are other ways to change the concrete world besides warfare.  Thomas Barnett’s approach, for instance, may alter the concrete world in ways that may greatly influence targets’ OODA loops, leading to acts beneficial to those who would employ TB’s EBO.  It is still to be seen, perhaps, if similar forces as TB would employ will have an unguided effect similar to those effects he would set as his operational goal. 5GW theory, in some respects, also suggests way of manipulating the concrete world through non-violent means, although violent means are also often discussed by 5GW theorists. In fact, TB’s theories also skirt the bounds between violent and non-violent means.

---

Rethinking the OODA
• Part One: Rethinking the OODA
• Part Two: EBO is Everything in War — Almost
• Part Three: Observing the Maturing World

---

Update: created new blog subcategory: OODA.

Update 9-20-06: reviewing this post once again, I realized that I had used a phrase, “Concrete Constructs” where I meant “Conditional Constructs” in one of the bulleted items below the diagram of the Revised OODA. This may have caused confusion for readers (although I missed it on many earlier readings, myself!). So I have now corrected it.