The Global Guerrilla Debate

I joined the debate agreeing with Dan and Purpleslog, that our limited understanding of GG — as expressed by John Robb at Global Guerrillas and his personal weblog — would characterize it as 3GW…except that, as Robb has described GG, it seems more like a phenomenon to me than any coherent movement or generation of warfare:

Part of my evolving concept of GG is this: That Robb’s describing an emergence similar to the emergence of a higher incidence of cancer when more carcinogens are pumped into the air. There is no “Global Guerrilla” movement, nor will be, because if there were it would be something like a combination of 3GW-mutated and 4GW. (One describes the tactics — lightning — whereas the other implies the glue, or motivation, behind it.)

As such, the “GG phenomenon” is just that, a phenomenon. Not a new generation of warfare. Not a movement. And, it is this understanding of GG that I most agree is possible or perhaps likely if other things are not also considered. [CGW]

I once made the same argument at Coming Anarchy, and here on PC in response to Robb’s claim that,

Coming Anarchy on Louis Beam and “leaderless resistance.” The big problem with the theory is that it assumed a need for a cohesive motivation/doctrine. It doesn’t.

[John Robb, on Louis Beam]

The discussion at Coming Anarchy led to a consideration of Robb’s claims that GG would not need a common motivation — which seemed to suggest, to me, that these disparate groups of guerrillas might eventually fight each other since they lack cohesion. Rather than forming some sort of Global Guerrilla movement,  the disparate groups would be a type of broad emergence in different places of different groups that, lacking “a cohesive motivation/doctrine” could as easily fall to fighting each other as fighting the Core-ish networking and systems of globalization.  Since I’ve already mentioned forms of advanced communication in this post, I’ll go ahead and quote my early metaphor in response to Robb’s comment:

The “global guerrilla” phenomenon could be considered an emergence similar to the emergence of broad cell phone usage or the emergence of city-states from nomadic tribes.  Different people are motivated in different locations to form networks of one sort or another, or to act in similar ways, without ever knowing each other, merely because a root desire is shared by all.  In cell phone usage, for instance, the need to communicate quickly is shared by businessmen, or by teeny-bop gossipers, or by terrorists, even if they may seem to have no “shared motivation.” This is game theory, or the theory that people are probably much more alike than unalike and will tend to act in similar ways, leading to a kind of emergence of group activity.  (Paths cross.)

[CGW, “Anarchy, Dissonance, and Emergence”]

If indeed these disparate groups share no common motivation, we might think of the appearance of guerrilla movements around the globe as a type of incoherent emergence, a phenomenon, rather than any sort of collective movement or generational pattern of warfare in toto although each group might operate in a 3GW or 4GW method on the local scale.  John Robb responded to that post on PC by saying, “Different motivations but a similar objective” is what he meant; to which I responded, “A similar objective is a similar motivation, insofar as objectives motivate individuals or groups.”   [Unfortunately, right about the time of that thread of conversation, Phatic Communion experienced a technical glitch making further commenting impossible; so, it ended there.]

It is my belief that this desire to see a coherent movement out of disparate, incoherent  phenomena leads John Robb’s theory astray.   But I can only judge this on the basis of what I have read on his blogs and various comments he has left around the Blogosphere.  His book on Global Guerrillas is finished and perhaps will give a better outline to his theory than the hit-or-miss method of blogospheric activity.  The difficulty in 1) saying, for instance, that these movements will emerge in unpredictable ways, remain in-coherent, while 2) predicting how they will emerge and what they will be like [see “Emergent Intelligence in Open Source Warfare” on Global Guerrillas], or presenting a coherent description, may make Robb’s rhetoric untenable (and bodes ill for the book), and it is this disjunction that has previously led me to ask, Which is it, impossible chaos or mere complexity?

In the PurpleSlog debate, I also pointed to the fact that John Robb will postulate the emergence of nodes of stability and resilience but consistently fails to consider the possibility that the incoherent sea of chaos he predicts will fail utterly in competition with the new forces of stability and resilience:

One of those things, which Robb considers from time to time but does not quite fold into his primary concept (it seems) is the potential emergence of forces for stability and resilience. He will say that cities or neighborhoods will begin to form secure “enclaves,” he will say that multi-generational households, which are on the increase, are a similar phenomenon, but he will not go so far as to hypothesize a contemporaneous emergence of stability at the local level in reaction to the environment of an emerging GG. To do so would admit the possibility that GG will never even get off the ground, at least not in the way he appears to imagine it will. [CGW]

John Robb joined the PurpleSlog debate to say, in essence, merely that Global Guerrillas is 4GW because, well, Lind said so.  As if that meant something.

Generations Redux

Dan tdaxp opened a thread at tdaxp to further the debate — “Global Guerrillas is 3GW (and not Global)” — and received a comment by Phil Jones outlining the case for GG as “global” 4GW, which John Robb picked up and reprinted on his weblog and Mark Safranski of Zenpundit also reprinted.

How’s that, for a display of the forces of disruption in competition with the forces of stability/resilience in open source networks?  John Robb should take note of the persistence of networks and stability by examining his own methodology.  But I digress…

This insistence on labeling GG as 4GW — as if the label is far more important than a consideration of what actually occurs, and as if the number or personage of whoever agrees with the labeling is so very, very important — may result because of the disagreement over our understandings of those generations and the labels meant to signify them.  PurpleSlog has neatly dissected Phil Jones’  outline of GG on tdaxp to show the gaps in that theory (or the gaps in our understanding of that theory) and has taken an objective look at our disagreements in comments on his own weblog:

I think we all agree that GG tactics resemble classical Guerrilla tactics and therefore resemble 4GW.

I think the split in opinions (”GG is 4GW” view, vs. “GG is 3GW that looks a bit like 4GW” view) is along the seems of alternative definitions of 4GW.

Hammes (The Sling and The Stone) characterizes 4GW as sending messages at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical, and additionally mental, physical an especially moral) to convince your opponents to quit fighting, quit opposing your aims, and to go home and do something else. Every action of the 4GW operator is psychological warfare. This also maps to attacking the observe/orient parts of the OODA [ed. - link removed]. Folks following this view (4GW is sending messages and is against a particular part of the OODA), will have problem characterizing GGs as 4GW. They will see the GG focus on physical infrastructure rear areas as a 3GW viewpoint.

4GW could also be described more generally as using guerilla techniques against the rear areas (mostly) of ones opponents to confuse, disrupt, and collapse the opponents. Folks having this view (4GW is advanced guerilla warfare) will not have a problem seeing GG as 4GW. I think this would be Lind’s implicit view (but I don’t know for sure and googling didn’t turn up anything). [PurpleSlog]

I recently took a look at Lind’s concept of Generations in “The Thunder Pig Thunders.”  In that thread, I promoted the following:

1. [Qualitative Shift as a description of refinements of tactics.]  “thinking of the generations of warfare as periods when warfare can be described in terms of refinement of tactics, inspired by shifting ground realities (including technology), when those tactics most come into prominence.”
2. [Generations may be contemporaneous.]  “these generations of warfare come into conflict…both styles of fighting, both generations of warfare, are contemporaneous.  There is no clean break between them in a practical time/space sense — they must both exist, in order to be in conflict…”
3. [The Qualitative Shift may not be instantaneous.]  “a broad period occurs when one generation and the following generation, responding to ground realities, might coexist at a relatively equal strength.  The ground realities ‘favor’ neither one.  During such a period, there may be stalemates.”
4. [The Qualitative Shift may — but may not — happen, eventually.] “the same ground realities that have inspired the next generation to form in response to them…may continue to develop, and at some point, the ground realities will favor the new generation over the prior generation, and we will see that ‘qualitative shift’ Lind mentions.”
5. [The prior generation may continue — but perhaps as part of the new.] “Even so, the old generation style of warfare continues as long as some ground realities justify it; thus, we might even consider the advent of a next-generation of warfare that is a mutation of the prior, during which tactics of previous forms of warfare are still utilized even as new tactics are born.”

This is a little of old-hat, since Lind in “The Changing Face of War” also outlined “elements that carry over.”

Elements That Carry Over

Earlier generational shifts, especially the shift from the second to the third generation, were marked by growing emphasis on several central ideas. Four of these seem likely to carry over into the fourth generation, and indeed to expand their influence.

The first is mission orders. Each generational change has been marked by greater dispersion on the battlefield. The fourth generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy’s society. Such dispersion, coupled with what seems likely to be increased importance for actions by very small groups of combatants, will require even the lowest level to operate flexibly on the basis of the commander’s intent.

Second is decreasing dependence on centralized logistics. Dispersion, coupled with increased value placed on tempo, will require a high degree of ability to live off the land and the enemy.

Third is more emphasis on maneuver. Mass, of men or fire power, will no longer be an overwhelming factor. In fact, mass may become a disadvantage as it will be easy to target. Small, highly maneuverable, agile forces will tend to dominate.

Fourth is a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture. Correct identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly important.

[Lind, ibid.]

These are things which have characterized previous generations (before Lind’s 4GW) but perhaps have been refined, and thus have received greater emphasis, in the next generation (Lind’s 4GW.)  The qualitative shift is not instantaneous because 1) much of the prior generations have gone forward, although refined and 2) the conflict between generations — along with shifting technologies — has spurred that refinement.  This takes time.  But is it any wonder then, that arguments can arise over when a qualitative shift has occurred and what that shift is, when the past extends into the present and the future?  In that post addressing Thunder Pig’s concerns, I commented that my own evolution might be a good metaphor for the evolution of warfare:

When critics of the concept of “generations of warfare” say that these styles of warfare have always been around, they are not far wrong:  similarly, the genes which make me have been around for a long time, but I am no pre-sapiens.  It’s just that new arrangements of genes, and mutations in genes, have given rise to a qualitatively different being. [CGW]

In asking what constitutes 4GW as a new generation, I would be looking for:

1. What tactics and strategies have continued into the present from 3GW.
2. To what degree have these tactics and strategies been refined.
3. To what degree have these refinements resulted in greater utility, and thus greater prominence.
4. To what degree have the tactics and strategies of 3GW mutated — rather than merely been refined.
5. And what new tactics and strategies have been added to 3GW — perhaps prompting whatever mutations have also occurred.

In looking at Robb’s Global Guerrillas, I would also ask these things if I wanted to determine whether GG was a 4GW style of fighting, a mutated 3GW style of fighting (3GW+), or merely the tail end of 3GW.

But John Robb has said, already, that Lind calls GG a 4GW.  Keeping in mind my previous criticisms of Global Guerrillas, outlined above, consider what Lind said in “The Changing Face of War” directly after listing his “elements that carry over”:

In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them.  [ed. - my emphasis]

• “widely dispersed” = Possibly, global.
• “largely undefined” +  “no definable battlefields and fronts” = Possibly, in-coherent.
• “nonlinear” + “Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth” = Cross-domain, open source.
• “Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations”…”lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred” = Disparate entities act together for success, although they may have different missions and thus different  responsibilities (each to his own understanding, motivation.)

From such a perspective, GG does appear to be Lind’s concept of 4GW — but, it appears to be the advanced stages of Lind’s 4GW, or, the idealized version, with a few differences.  In looking at terrorism, Lind wrote that “It is not a new phenomenon, and so far it has proven largely ineffective.”  He then considers what happens when terrorism is combined with new technology and postulates three additional elements to be added to what has already been:

1. A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion. Our national security capabilities are designed to operate within a nation-state framework. Outside that framework, they have great difficulties. The drug war provides an example. Because the drug traffic has no nation-state base, it is very difficult to attack….

Non-state actors — check! But John Robb has gone far to postulate absolutely no “base.”  For instance, ideology and religion or any other sort of common motivation is ruled out in the GG scenario.  One may wonder if the “Bazaar of Violence” may promote a type of common ideology shared by all of Robb’s GG — but Robb wouldn’t.  Not quite.

2. A direct attack on the enemy’s culture. Such an attack works from within as well as from without. It can bypass not only the enemy’s military but the state itself. The United States is already suffering heavily from such a cultural attack in the form of the drug traffic. Drugs directly attack our culture….Some ideological elements in South America see drugs as a weapon; they call them the “poor man’s intercontinental ballistic missile.” They prize the drug traffic not only for the money it brings in through which we finance the war against ourselves — but also for the damage it does to the hated North Americans.

At first, this sounds more like a 5GW operation, at least as far as 5GW has been considered.  (A little more on this later…)  But again we have mention of “ideological elements,” and we can see that Lind is hypothesizing coordinated attacks made by coherent entities with a coherent and common motivation.  So, Robb’s theory of GG fails this comparison as well.

3. Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, particularly television news. Some terrorists already know how to play this game. More broadly, hostile forces could easily take advantage of a significant product of television reporting — the fact that on television the enemy’s casualties can be almost as devastating on the home front as are friendly casualties. If we bomb an enemy city, the pictures of enemy civilian dead brought into every living room in the country on the evening news can easily turn what may have been a military success (assuming we also hit the military target) into a serious defeat.

Again, this at first seems very 5GWish.  But Robb’s GG are more interested in system-disruption than psychological or morale warfare.  So, nope, GG does not fit this new tactic, either.

These three potential “new” tactics proposed by Lind — in October 1989 — are meant to give an example of what Lind called “synthesis” in the essay, a synthesis which the prior generation of warfare could not  successfully combat.  I.e., looking at the fifth point in my consideration of generations of warfare, these tactics might promote a mutation in 3GW, and the synthesis of the new and the mutation could lead to a qualitative shift.  Perhaps in reviewing this essay, however, we should consider very carefully what Lind meant in the last phrase of that essay:

…what will the fourth generation be?

Quite possibly, some other things now being considered as catalysts for mutation would lead to the actual 4GW and not these three.  Or, perhaps one or two of these three with other things.  I made a comment at PurpleSlog which I would repeat here, but with a twist to follow:

This is also why, when Robb’s whole argument in this thread was “Lind said so!” I reacted more or less with disdain. The argument from someone else’s authority is hardly persuasive when discussing ideas and terminology. The term, “4GW”, must describe the phenomenon or methods rather than a system of understanding entirely enclosed within another’s head: I.e., we must be able to apply it on our own if it actually describes what is happening, but claims of ownership of ideas will invariably reduce those ideas to useless orthodoxy quite removed from actual phenomena.

The twist is in how orthodoxy has already set in for 4GW theorists.  Some appear to consider these last three potential new tactics as the gospel of 4GW:  4GW has some unifying ideology or religion.  These are those who will most disagree with John Robb’s theory that GG is 4GW.  Others, however, take the earlier mentioned aspects of 4GW — those bold phrases I highlighted above — and may insist that GG fits very nicely with Lind’s description of 4GW.  Lind himself may have fallen into orthodoxy as well since 1989, perhaps as a result of seeing many of his predictions come true in the intervening years.

But there is one Lindian orthodoxy I must categorically despise, and it is one he himself should also despise, if he would only review his own 1989 essay.

On Seeing 5GW

Besides his argument to authority concerning GG as 4GW, John Robb also threw in a reiteration (talk about stability/resilience!!) of Lind’s 2004 assessment of 5GW theory:

Curtis, I agree with Lind in that it is too early to call 5GW. [Robb]

Attempting to visualize a Fifth Generation from where we are now is like trying to see the outlines of the Middle Ages from the vantage point of the late Roman Empire.  [Lind: “Fifth Generation Warfare?”]

And I quipped in response,

[T]o say that “it is too early to call 5GW” presupposes a type of 5GW already that cannot be called. I.e., merely shutting one’s eyes might easily lead to the impression that nothing can be seen. [CGW]

My statements, I realized, were a bit of mish-mash.  In the first, I meant that one cannot say a thing is not visible unless one already has an image of it in mind — not seeing that image, one would then say, “It’s not visible!”  In the second statement, I meant to explain the first; namely, that having that image in mind becomes unnecessary for a declaration of invisibility if one merely closes one’s eyes to preclude having to compare image with the appearance of the actuality (thus precluding the admission of having such an image in mind!)

In the past, I’ve explained this phenomenon of seeing and not-seeing via use of the word ignorance.  We are all ignorant of some things, perhaps each to his own domain of ignorance, but the word itself comes from the verb to ignore.  I had a brilliant high school physics teacher who explained it this way:

“There is a difference between stupidity and ignorance.  We are all ignorant, to some degree, since none of us is omniscient.  But some people choose to remain ignorant, and I call that stupidity.”

It would seem that trying to make the noun by doing the verb is stupidity.  But normally, I prefer not to use the word stupidity and stick to the use of ignorance.

My latest comment at PurpleSlog addressed something I’ve been considering about 5GW for some time but had not quite been prepared to address.  As a follow-up to PurpleSlog’s consideration of the different definitions of 4GW, I wrote this comment in consideration of 5GW:

Incidentally, I wonder if you’ve come close to proposing something I’ve been pondering, that our ideas of an OODA-driven 5GW may in fact be a kind of mutated 4GW — perhaps not quite a new “generation” although not quite the common understanding of 4GW (of either type of understanding of 4GW.) Even Lind, in “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, says that,

“Psychological operations may become the dominant operational and strategic weapon in the form of media/information intervention. Logic bombs and computer viruses, including latent viruses, may be used to disrupt civilian as well as military operations. Fourth generation adversaries will be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy population’s support of its government and the war. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions.”

But this is related to some things I’ve previously written, when discussing generations of warfare. Not only has Lind said that some tactics carry over to the next generation [which I say may lead to “mutations” in styles of warfare] but in the text cited here, and in that essay in general, he implies that psych-ops will be supplemental, “where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. [my emphasis.]” Our working and general concept of 5GW goes a bit beyond that, and it’s quite tempting to say that Lind has anticipated 5GW even if he is not aware that he has. In fact, separating the generations into distinct styles might itself be only an artificial construct we use to understand what occurs — because, it would be just as easy to say that what we think of as 4GW is merely a mutation of 3GW (but not, strictly speaking, 3GW, since it is a mutation; so it is “3GW+”) on the way to what we’ve been calling 5GW. [CGW]

In my previous consideration of phase shifting, although discussing Core-Gap hypotheses I also considered the question of generations of warfare by considering supplemental use and a refinement and greater prominence for various tactics. [“Skinning the Gap”]  A kind of continuum occurs during the evolution, and we might look back, as Lind has done, and make constructs of generational difference which are always somewhat artificial, believing that we “see” distinct creatures.  In some ways, these creatures are distinct; in fact, each creature may be entirely unique and individual — Although GG in many ways appears to be another name for “global revolution,” at least as it is often described, there will be differences.  But we are not incapable of predicting the growth of these individual creatures in advance.  John Robb certainly appears to do so, since GG is not yet fully realized (heh).  Even Lind, as we can see by the final phrase in his 1989 essay, was making prophecy by looking at the present. Significant to this prophecy-making is our ability to spot slight variations between the present and the past, or to detect new phenomena as they happen but before they have flowered — or so we hope, because we cannot always predict how they will flower or if some new species will destroy them before they have had the chance to flower…and even germinate.

Lind has already pointed at an area that may have significant refinement in the future, whenever he has written of psychological warfare, the power of media, and attacking a society’s culture.  But in 1989 he believed these things would be supplemental. Others since have focused on a limited use of these, since 4GWarriors in theory would influence societies in only a small handful of ways via media and culture warfare.  They have seen these things, because media has always been extraordinarily important to human societies, whether merely in the form of language, or of poetry, or of edicts, or of scientific texts, or of Theses nailed to Church doors, or of holy words and texts preserved for millennia.  These things direct society; but, these things come from many, many directions — particularly more so in the modern world — and thus represent a complexity that seems impossible to control and direct.  Actually, they were far more controlled, in some ways, in previous times (say, before the printing press was invented, but also before the Internet was invented.)

We naturally seek to control others via media transmission.

How do we “naturally seek to control others via media transmission?”

Well, did you begin to consider all the ways of control when reading that?  Heh.  Questions are incredibly powerful forces of control.  That’s part of the reason why so many men dread hearing the question, “Do you love me?”   Y’see, we naturally respond to questions by trying to find the answers, or at least trying to find the answers we think others are wanting to hear.  Try going through an entire day without responding in the slightest to any question asked of you — I mean by “slightest,” also without even thinking about the question and potential answers.  Resisting their influence is very, very difficult.  This is because almost everything we consider “society” is a result of meme transference. Human networks in our modern world would be quite impossible without meme transference, as would be all our present systems of commerce and warfare. 

Controlling societies (whether national societies or societies of “global guerrillas” or friendship networks; etc.) via refined meme transference might seem fanciful; but ask advertisers and marketers and politicians how it is done.  Some of these are better than others.  But even Lind said, in his 1989 essay: “All of these elements already exist. They are not the product of ‘futurism,’ of gazing into a crystal ball.” Because the Memosphere is so complex, especially in our globalizing world, it is often easier to control by influencing rather than by destroying:  still difficult, but not impossible.  Lindian 4GW forces are doing something similar now, since America and the Core are not destroyed, nor are our military forces, but are greatly influenced and disrupted by these dispersed 4GW entities.  I once postulated that our very concept of creation has been greatly modified:

I also have a musing on a type of “creationism” at P.C. you might find relevant: nowadays, most Americans “make” via ideas rather than objects. Most of us don’t weave our own cloth or forge our own tools, thus we don’t need to know how to do those things. With cheap products, we don’t need to know how to repair our own possessions as long as we can buy replacements without too much effort. (We don’t rebuild cars but buy new cars, or repair televisions but buy new televisions, etc.) There are creators of these things; but the ratios are different now, since fewer creators can supply for more consumers. But as I am doing here, many Americans “create” via ideas: songs, art, novels, financial portfolios, blog posts, legislation, and other immaterial items. So capitalism has developed hand-in-hand with the expansion of Liberal Education in some odd co-evolutionary matrix.

[CGW, at tdaxp]

—and this shift is directly related to our social shift toward the Memosphere and away from material connections for forming human networks.  True, the material connections make this other possible — hence, the Lindian and Robbian concepts of dispersed but disrupting agents — but they operate in the background or else intensify the lean toward the Memosphere, e.g., in the idolatrous notion that material possessions reflect the social “worth” of the individual.  This is dangerous, quite dangerous, when we are faced with the threat of either a Lindian 4GW force or a 5GW force that utilizes 4GW proxies and pawns.  But if we examine things more closely, we might also begin to see how Lindian 4GW forces have also so shifted — are ideologically driven — and yet also rely on material connections — the “Bazaar of Violence” — for continuing that ideological advancement.

And, really, I wonder if Lind could have realized in 1989 the full extent of the Internet and how it would influence the development of 4GW?  Because the Memosphere is “widely dispersed” and “largely undefined,” “nonlinear” with “no definable battlefields or fronts” and is quite open source, with people interacting on a daily basis for their own peculiar reasons and motivations, we could come close to considering these concepts of 5GW as merely another form of 4GW, perhaps 4GW+ — or else it is 4GW while GG and Lindian 4GW are merely 3GW+.

Y’see, that’s the difficulty.  But given the further-reaching aspect of theories of 5GW, I am more inclined to believe it is a real qualitative shift — one that is occurring and already in conflict with previous generations of warfare, but without yet quite breaking out of stalemate with those or not yet reaching that stalemate.

Two things seem likely, however:

1. Lindian 4GWarriors tend to have an orthodoxy of ideology. This is the glue that ties them together and leads them to act toward a common purpose. This orthodoxy is thus far rather limited, sure to always have opponents (whether other orthodox ideology-motivated opponents or pluralistic factions opposing their orthodoxy), and this limitation on their expansion is rather severe. Their opponents always have the option of employing similar tactics, but with more potential force at their disposal for seeing those tactics — or perhaps entirely new tactics — through to ultimate long-term victory. But should these 4GW forces begin to succeed, they will consolidate their power and become…non-4GW forces, although perhaps retaining what they have learned in their pursuit of victory.
2. Robb’s GG may be far too dispersed, possibly inter-warring, to compete with the forces of orthodoxy or pluralistic factions. I.e., the forces of stability, order, and resilience may simply outweigh the forces for disruption, ultimately. Incidentally, this does not mean that states will do this; but, it could be quite local like the GG forces. Because the emergence of GG is phenomenal, I rather doubt any predictions made in advance by GG theorists, and I rather doubt we can say definitively now that an emergence of stability and resilience in reaction to that phenomenon would necessarily be weaker than the emergence of those forces for instability.

5GW forces, because they will work with and within chaos to establish paradigms, and will do so consciously, will be forces for stability, resilience, and organization — which is qualitatively different than either Lindian 4GW or Robbian 4GW.

———

Correction and Update [6-9-06]: Initially used the term “bizarre of violence” twice instead of “bazaar of violence” — but often it seems that the two terms may be interchangeable when considering the Global Guerrilla theory. For instance, I have wondered if that Bazaar could lead to a bizarre ideology formed around a culture of violence and aggression — similar to the way a drug culture could form around the supply/demand for drugs — perhaps a common ideology shared by many GG’s, particularly if the GG phenomenon becomes as wide-spread as John Robb has suggested.