A few notes, first, on items which have provoked me the most:

Notes

First, on Dr. Challans’ intriguing essay:
• Dr. Challans’ critique of the effects-based approach (EBA) and effects-based operations (EBO) seems spot-on, although his insistence that the approach is “morally bereft” is troublesome.  At least he makes the distinction that morality (for theories) is a result of epistemological and logical virtue rather than that it rests on some preordained theological morality:

  The effects-based approach is morally bereft, and our moral challenges will only increase as we continue to embrace this doctrine.  EBA lacks any moral quality because it fails in every sense as a theory.

  I suspect that he uses the term “morally bereft” to confuse his listeners, many of whom may have been already greatly influenced by the advocates of EBA/EBO; later, he asserts at the conclusion of his essay that “It is no accident that many EBA advocates prefer the theory of intelligent design.”


• However, the mention of intelligent design is important, because it, too, is a theory which presupposes determinism, like the effects-based approach.  Unfortunately, Dr. Challans suggests that advocates of his competing theory, SOD, prefer the theory of evolution.  Both theories are founded in determinism.  One supposes an intelligence which creates and directs life — everything is predetermined, or designed, by this intelligence — and the other supposes a set of scientific laws, materials, etc., which predetermine the activity and outcome of material systems.

  It is interesting that both theories also suppose a role for Chance or random activity.  Proponents of intelligent design often believe in human free will — the ability to choose good or evil actions, which will change the very universe (particularly the personal environment of the chooser)  — and proponents of evolution often depend on the occurrence of random mutations to explain the operation of their theory in the material universe.  This is funny beyond my ability to express it.  (See Unrolling the Future.) This unacknowledged reliance on Chance within largely deterministic theories also suggests that both theories are “morally bereft” — although, to be sure, I do not believe that Dr. Challan’s reference to the theories should be used to represent both EBA and SOD.



• Dr. Challan’s use of time — particularly, the movements between cause and effect — for his argument is peculiar, though understandable.  I wonder, is he really dissecting the various virtues of deductive, abductive, and inductive reasoning in warfare?  I find his argument against EBA to be quite good, simply for the fact that EBA depends greatly on a singular focus on specific effects and specific operations to achieve those effects: this is pigeonholing in warfare; it leads to too narrow a focus, particularly when chance can enter the equation at nearly any point and disrupt the operations — and thus, the design — of strategists.  This reminds me of Montaigne’s observation:
  

  As for military enterprises, everyone sees how large a part Fortune has in them.  Even in our counsels and our deliberations there must certainly be some chance and good luck mixed in; for all that our wisdom can do is not much; the sharper and livelier it is, the more weakness it finds in itself and the more it mistrusts itself.  I am of Sulla’s opinion; when I scrutinize closely the most glorious exploits of war, I see, it seems to me, that those who conduct them make use of deliberation and counsel only for form; they abandon the better part of the enterprise to Fortune, and, in the confidence they have in her help, go beyond the limits of all reason at every turn.
  

  Montaigne’s observation seems like dangerous advice (if it can be taken as advice) in our modern systems of warfare; look at the immediate fall of Baghdad, the apparent misfortune of having abandoned designing “the peace” in favor of implementing “the war.”  On the other hand, if a strategist begins with the understanding that much Chance will act upon the designs which flow from his deliberations, he is more likely to anticipate the need to adapt his design.  Thus, the “abandonment..to Fortune” mentioned by Montaigne is really a reliance on one’s own ability to adapt to a changing environment. More to the point, perhaps, preparation for adaptation in advance is qualitatively different than choosing to adapt at the moment when a predetermined design is at the point of failing. So Dr. Challans seems to be arguing that EBA, because it depends so much on the virtue of cause—->effect, has eliminated any prior acknowledgment that the careful designs may in fact be faulty.  Chance is not included in the design in any realistic and useful manner.


• When contemplating the effects of Chance in warfare, one must consider all the unanticipated factors that may come to bear on operations. Our military commanders are quite aware of this need — there are even “unknown unknowns” — but I wonder to what degree this awareness has influenced the grand strategists.  The very hierarchical structure of the military, rooted below, throughout, and above our branches (with perhaps minor exceptions), leads to the kind of linear EBA thought being criticized by Dr. Challans.  He is correct to point out that EBA is a primarily materialistic theory, that effects sought in the approach are dependent on a restructuring of the physical environment (bombing campaigns, bullets through the breast, whatever), and also that such a restructuring is believed to influence enemies and allies alike.  But the same thinking shapes our military at its most basic levels.  “Intelligent design” is the modus operandi of our military, since strategies are delivered from on-high to the subordinates who will carry out those strategies with the help of the lower ranks who are also following the dictates of a voice from “on-high” (though perhaps not as high.)  This linear chain is not much different that the linear chain being criticized by Dr. Challans, and it is “morally bereft” to the degree that the voice from on-high is strong : that voice is not on the ground, is less able to judge the ground realities, thus becomes more abstract and will require and establish a more stringent and inviolable faith in a predetermined cause—>effect.

  Problematically, “unknown unknowns” cannot be known until they become knowns.  So any theory which would admit Chance into the equation cannot depend on even the farthest-reaching consideration of potential factors.  Such a consideration is in fact an abrogation of Chance.
  



• But there are known knowns, and the further we expand the scope of our knowledge, the more we can only help ourselves, so long as we don’t fall into the error of believing there are no unknown unknowns.  Dr. Challans’ consideration of individual psychologies as motivators which go largely unacknowledged or unknown for EBA strategists is important, since subjective realities do not always follow the scientific cause—>effect of physics.  His warning reminds me strongly of Ralph Peters’ warning that secular think-tanks and strategists may be strategizing in a vacuum. (Examined here on PC.) But we would need to dismiss all our history in order to believe that human motivations are entirely unpredictable.
  


• Dr. Challans’ critique of EBA reminds me of criticisms I have made against Objectivists — and I am not surprised by this:  Objectives/Objectivists.  My central criticism is that Objectivists often fail to acknowledge 1) their limited sensory perceptions (experience), 2) their limited ability for analysis (which may be genetic; which may be a result of cognitive insularity), and 3) the objective reality of subjectivity (we do not have an objective theory of mind, but only hypotheses), while supposing that they have everything they need to make grand pronouncements on the shape and functions of the world and to prognosticate future events.
  

On John Robb’s essay:
• First, I think we may safely segregate the topic of “Emergence” into two categories: the objective and the subjective.

  Often when speaking of emergence, what we call emergent orders or emergent systems are merely the sudden realizations of orders and systems which are already present though perhaps hidden or previously unnoticed; or, such emergence is epiphany, if you will.  Poetry might serve as a good example: some sort of order, the result of many complex interactions of devices utilized in the poem, presents itself to the reader.  One reader may not “see” the same thing another reader “sees.”  The best poems create an “Aha!” moment or experience, as the order emerges.  But no matter who reads the poem, and no matter what orders are at last observed to exist within the poem, the poem itself remains the same: whatever orders are present were already present, and we have only become aware of them. The emergence is subjective, but it is still emergence; from the complexity order has emerged even if we can explain it in no other way than by the poem itself. (A large part of this emergence is dependent on more than the words on the page or even the arrangement of those words; it is also a result of the confluence of the actual objects to which the words refer or which the words evoke; so, a structuring of the words is a structuring of ideas based on actual phenomena. As such, interpretations of poems — and emergent orders — can be quite subjective, or vary from reader to reader for any given poem.)

  Objective emergence would be the formation of new orders or cohering systems from complex sets of material objects (and forces, energy) which have not hitherto interacted as a system en masse.  This form of emergence is nearly beyond my ability to address it.  First, distinguishing between subjective emergence and objective emergence is extremely difficult, since to observe objective emergence would present me with the problem: has some new collection of materials formed a new and unique order (objective emergence), or has that order merely now come into my awareness (subjective emergence)? I.e., was the order already present but merely unknown to me before now?  Nonetheless, I can suppose objective emergence to be an actual phenomenon which may occur even when I am not present to witness it or am incapable of witnessing it. At the same time, we should not dismiss the interaction of these two types of emergence: insofar as our ability to act depends on an understanding or awareness of all factors within our environment, the subjective emergence which matches the objective emergence is critical to our success.

  The distinction between the two is important, particularly if we are to understand the role of emergence in modern warfare.  Dr. Challans implied the futility of drawing straight lines out of constituent elements of a system: the lines are sure to break or else the true elements will continue to operate chaotically around the lines, oblivious to the lines as the lines are oblivious to them.  John Robb implies the futility of trying to discern the complex system in its entire complexity.  I.e., John Robb suggests that [1] an objective emergence occurs and that [2] we are too limited for a harmonious (corresponding) subjective emergence to occur:

  [1] The insurgency will continue to improve over time  Despite losses, the macro behavior of the Iraqi insurgency will become more complex (virulent) the longer it operates.….
  Breakout is possible. While it is unlikely that the insurgency will spread horizontally to other countries in an incremental fashion, it is very likely that those trained in this environment will seed other movements (and inevitable that the knowledge of this will initiate activity). Further, this breakout can occur globally and in unexpected locales — since this neutral method isn’t tied to any single motive, it can be applied to any cause.

  [2]  It is impossible to discern the motives of this movement. The motives of individual actors are easy to discern. A global motive is impossible to uncover, particularly since it is the culmination of thousands of local interactions. Even observations of the movement’s global pattern of activity might be fruitless, since the time horizon is likely too short for accurate measurement. The movement is in a constant process of maturation in response to evolving environmental conditions.
  



• John Robb’s ideas spark in me the thought that his suppositions about emergence do not allow for emergence. “The insurgency will continue to improve over time” and may “breakout” are predictions which follow a cause—>effect path even if the causes are lumped together and described as too complex to define individually.  Interestingly, “motive” comes from the Latin for “to move”, and we are being told that the movement can be discerned even if we cannot discern the motives or the “global motive.”  In fact, he has attempted to define the “global motive” by defining the global movement: “The movement is a constant process of maturation in response to evolving conditions.”  What is interesting about that statement is the way an EBA approach may modify the global movement if the conditions are strategically altered.
• Further complicating matters: How are the constituent human elements of an emergent system to know that they are elements of this system?  —
  

  Open source actors are mainly focused on local activity. The simplicity of this focus is a feature and not a bug since it prevents activity that may upset the entire organism’s operation. Local action, global impact.
  

  This strikes me as being true, but it suggests that local actors do not invest much time in worrying about the global impact or the shape of the global movement/motive.  The more complex the system, the more distraction worrying about directing its development; and large-scale worrying about its development would produce gross levels of inefficiency.  In addition, this suggests that a subjective emergence will not need to align exactly with the objective emergence: individual actors may not need to “see” the final outcomes.  This is interesting, considering what John Robb says next:
  

  Random interactions are necessary. Random interactions between groups and individuals outside is a necessity (this assumes a certain level of mobility and communications capability). These interactions provide a fluidity to the learning process that finds and responds to new information quickly.
  

  He is talking about cells interacting, or groups within the movement interacting, I think; later, “pattern matching” and “an openness to interaction” are ideas used to suggest that these independent groups will nonetheless align — thus forming  a complex integrity — even if members of those groups are not fully aware of the overall pattern.  The problem comes when we wonder (as I have wondered) if the ignorance of overall patterns may mean that members of an emergent system may be fairly unaware that they are members of that system.  For instance, U.S. and coalition forces may be members of the same system as the insurgents without knowing that they are members of a large, emergent system.  We can break out two theoretical motivations: All members of Group A hate the American presence in Iraq and are working to remove that presence, and all members of Group B are determined to stay in Iraq until the job is done.  But that would be a simplification — a homogenization of members for each group — and wouldn’t that contradict the theory that individual motivations cannot be discerned?  When I consider the “random interactions” and “the willingness to interact”, I can easily suppose that Group A and Group B fit those descriptions, vis-a-vis each other, even if the form of interaction is hostile.
  


• John Robb’s term “emergent intelligence” is curious, because it implies an objective intelligence which differs from the subjective or individual intelligences involved in the system.  Group intelligence, used in this manner, appears to be merely the aligning of individual intelligences toward a shared goal or at least a shared awareness of broad objectives, perhaps of grand objectives: not all individual motivations may be shared, but a communal “primal strategy” might be shared, and thus a primal mind or emergent intelligence might come into being.  The term strikes me as being a tad too metaphysical, however, when other familiar terms might be used.  On the other hand, I wonder about tracing back the, er, designs of the Emergent Intelligence to find the shape of that intelligence, much as I would make the heretical supposition that the Universe might be used to discern the motivations of the intelligent designer — if I were a proponent of “intelligent design.” This would not be the same as discerning individual motivations, but merely suggests the possibility of discerning an emergent motivation — a term which might come in handy (elsewise called a “strange attractor.”)  (If I knew more about power laws, I might take a stab at it for the insurgency in Iraq.)
  

Hypotheses

• Montaigne’s ideas on Fortune. And my own: allowing for chance, or for the emergence of unknown unknowns which does not threaten defeat, may require a realignment of forces into decentralized and largely independent cadres who share common grand objectives.  By decentralized, I mean much less micromanagement by higher-ups.  By independent, I mean also that they would not come frequently into contact with one another — so as to avoid the potential for devastating and dangerous confusion — but would nonetheless have “random interactions,” for “pattern matching” and have “an openness to interaction.”  Greater adaptability would result; but they must be prepared in advance for the emergence of unknown unknowns; indeed, they would be trained to chuck all preexisting schemes at the drop of a hat or pin and encouraged to modify procedures, tactics, etc., on the basis of local events, without the threat which comes implicit with top-down micromanagement.  We already have this, but we need more of this.
• Devastation from on-high (by which I mean our high-tech toys) should be limited to 1) large-scale operations, particularly at the outset or else 2) high-tech unmanned drones used for surveillance and narrow strikes from the field.  The last will become more feasible as these drones are refined, new drones are developed, and more personnel are trained to utilize them, and would improve adaptability for the individual cadres.  Our most powerful high-tech toys should serve as a deterrence to similar large-scale forces during peace, a wedge into new highly-defended theaters during war, for general broad-scale devastation during war when the stakes are high enough to warrant it (i.e., when the moral — and morale — losses are less significant), or for non-combat support such as surveillance and transportation.  Soldiers who depend too much on mommy and daddy do not help themselves.  (Again, top-down management encourages this reliance; I should add this to my discussion of Nanny States.)
• Grand Objectives: not to be confused with lesser objectives.  Many “objectives” for the cadres would be determined by them on the field, in response to the local environment.  Also, grand objectives are not grand strategies. Indeed, the utilization of emergence — which goes beyond a mere recognition of the occasional occurrence of emergence — would be the grand strategy.  But power laws exist within complex, emerging orders and in fact direct the emergence.  Top-level commanders would not isolate nodes or aim at particular effects so much as create situations which 1) are at least not helpful to the enemy, 2) are, preferably, quite detrimental to the enemy, or 3) which is as good, would be confusing for the enemy.  These are some of the grand objectives, expressed in the broadest terms; individual cadres would decide which nodes are to be attacked or which effects are to be the goal when they determine the lesser objectives.  As guidelines for the grand objectives — or, clarifications — top-level commanders and their cadre of analysts would choose among cadres to be put into the field — and, which to remove, if the grand objectives are not being met.  (Now that I think of it, this is a bit of “Lawrence of Arabia.”)
• Twisting the Cue: In addition to the immediately preceding, EBA attacks would be utilized, specific targets set from above, well-defined objectives pursued.  The trick is getting a balance of those acting only on Grand Objectives and those targeting predetermined objectives with specific strategy in mind, because the enemy has less ability to respond or adapt: “god does not only operate in mysterious ways, but has it in for you.”  Preferably, these attacks would not operate in conjunction with the others — in support or in addition.   However, these attacks might change the environment in unforeseen ways for the GO cadres; but then, they should expect such sudden changes, although they are unknown unknowns until they happen.
• Outposts of Operation: Some will be hidden, some will be centralized,well-known, and heavily defended.  These are where the cadres have their random encounters, random dialog, etc., and restock supplies  But the cadres are not on a fixed schedule (except for reports from the field.)  In some cases, groups of GO cadres would work together; and in some others, they might established well-fortified outposts in new locations, as the situation warrants.  Large defending forces — perhaps with their big high-tech toys — might move into these new fortifications.
• Birds in the Bush: In the hand may be better, but either way, local allies, operatives, and informants would be utilized by the GO forces at their discretion.
• No Dancing with the Dervishes: What the enemy does is far less important that what we do.  This is important.  Most activity will be proactive rather than reactive.  This may seem counterintuitive, especially given John Robb’s description of emergent behavior, “The movement is in a constant process of maturation in response to evolving environmental conditions,” but emergence is always forward — maturation — even if in new directions and scope.  The emergent order is directed forward by power laws, and it is our business to tap into those laws.  To the degree that the enemy also taps into those same laws, and we tap into the enemy (or dance with the dervishes), we are cohabiting in an emergent order with them and they will persist. Unless we are to stop thinking of them as enemies, we should focus on an emergent order which does not include them.  For the GO cadres, this means: no Tit for Tat; no sympathizing, no emulating (except to confuse), none of the above.  It also means being far less concerned with the enemy’s occasional successes (including the deaths of our comrades, or of civilians, or the erection of new obstacles.)  If, however, the enemy presents a new weakness, a new node, or lets his guard slip, we slip in the knife.
• Emergence Training:  especially for our analysts, but also for GO forces in the field. This would facilitate the decision of fields of operation and choice of cadres for the top-level analysts and commanders, but it would also improve the selection process for lesser objectives in the field for GO forces.  Emergence training would involve, primarily, looking for patterns which may be emerging in the environment (local for GO forces, and larger theater of operations — even beyond — for top-level analysts and commanders.)  Rather than a top-down approach toward achieving results, or EBA, emergence training would stress the importances of 1) observing the present power laws and environment, as they extend beyond us or around us or despite us, searching for patterns,  2) causing ripples in the patterns through the implementation of tactics informed by our Grand Objectives, and 3) determining what emerges within the changed environment as a result (this is #1 again.)  Importantly, rather than determine a specific change and then back-forming an action that will result in that change, the Emergence warrior never stops acting because no specific effect is sought: there is no end-point, but a constant move forward (although of course the route may appear to change for an outside observer — hopefully, for the enemy.)   The focus for the Emergence warrior is not specific effect, nor strictly speaking cause, but the tactics informed by the Grand Objectives.  When these have been applied repeatedly, by multiple cadres at multiple points in multiple ways, eventually an order will emerge informed by them.

  Perhaps I should amend my description of the method.  #1 and #3 are the same, but they are used primarily for determining the end of activity.  I.e., when observation of the environment causes the subjective emergence of that grand order, Victory, then the Emergence warrior stops acting.  In absence of such an emergence, the Emergence warrior continues with #2. 

  In addition, #1 & #3 help the Emergence warrior know the effects of his activity on the environment, which is a learning process: primarily, the warrior learns whether he is having any effect at all.  If not, or if he has inadvertently worked in opposition to the Grand Objectives, then he must try something else in #2.