Asia Times Online has a couple interesting commentaries on the issue of Iran’s nuclear capability and the opponents of that capability. 

The first is a pessimistic prognostication by the pseudonymous commentator “Spengler” who believes the West will attack Iran.  Some might claim — and, some have — that a military strike against Iran will ultimately prove the most cost effective strategy for defusing the disastrous political, military, and economic threats in the region; but “Spengler” argues only the inevitability of the attack.  In fact, he appears to believe that chaos is coming to the region whether the chaos is instigated by Iran’s President Ahmedinejad or by the U.S.’s President George W. Bush:

Rather than a legacy of prosperity and democracy in the Middle East, the administration of US President George W Bush will exit with an economy weakened by higher oil prices and chaos on the ground in Iraq and elsewhere. But it really has no other options, except to let a nuclear-armed spoiler loose in the oil corridor. We have begun the third act of the tragedy that started on September 11, 2001, and I see no way to prevent it from proceeding.

I am sympathetic.  The difficulty in globalist engineering arises from the complexity of human populations, whether viewed on the individual level, the military-industrial level, the state level or the international level.  The best-laid plans of mice and men, and all that.  In this commentary, “Spengler” appears to be ambivalent about Iran’s president  — whom he has compared favorably with Hitler in past commentaries; here, he steps back to view the trouble with Ahmedinejad/Hitler:

Ahmedinejad’s apocalyptic inclinations have inspired considerable comment from Western analysts, who note that he appears to believe in the early return of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam. I do not know whether Ahmedinejad is mad or sane, but even mad people may be sly and calculating. Iran’s prospects are grim. Over a generation it faces demographic decay, economic collapse and cultural deracination. When reason fails to provide a solution to an inherently insoluble problem, irrationality well may take hold. Like Hitler, who also was mad but out-bluffed the West for years before overreaching, Ahmedinejad is pursuing a rational if loathsome imperial policy.

“Spengler” looks at “the Oil Corridor” which stretches from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to eastern Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Oman, and suggests that Iran is in competition with Russia, China, the U.S., and the EU for control of access to these oil supplies and may, in fact, attempt to assert exclusive control.  This is interesting; but it is easy to question such assertions because “Spengler” appears to view his analysis through the lens of his pet theory on the Hitler/Ahmedinejad comparison.

The other commentary on Asia Times Online is a look at Turkey’s role in the present crisis by a corresponent based in Iran, Iason Athanasiadis. The focus is interesting, because too little attention has been paid to the role of Turkey in the region.  Previously on Phatic Communion, I have speculated on the Iran-Turkey pas de deux through the lens of the Independent Kurdistan movement; in the comments to that post, I speculated on the possibility that Iran’s influence within Iraq might lead to a destabilization of ties between the West and Turkey:

The U.S. is walking a fine line between supporting democracy, advocating a free Kurdistan (even if only as a semi-autonomous region of Iraq), while condemning terrorism committed by Turkish Kurds in the name of freedom. In fact, I suspect that Iran’s influence over the religious Shiite politicians of Iraq has led to calls for trifurcation in both, Northern Iraq and Southern Iraq: not only does this make Iraq an easy target (for a military that can secure oil, or even merely for a sympathetic Iraqi rulership of southern Iraq), but it also destabilizes Turkey and the ties between Turkey and the EU/U.S.

Iason Athanasiadis also contemplates Turkey’s precarious position:

But US attempts to intimidate Turkey into cooperating against Iran could yield results. Ankara may decide that it has learned from the punishment inflicted on it by Washington after its parliament’s decision to ban US troops from opening a northern front against Iraq from Incirlik, during the 2003 invasion, and offer logistic support.

On the other hand, Turkey will not want to jeopardize its advantageous trade links with Iran. Bilateral trade jumped in 2005 to an estimated US$4 billion, up from $1 billion in 2000. Turkish intelligence has also established a good rapport with its Iranian counterparts on the Kurdish issue since 2003.

Now, a working group meets twice a year to discuss how to deal with Kurdish separatism, while border meetings are arranged on a monthly basis between the governors of Turkish and Iranian provinces that contain Kurdish populations. Turkey is painfully aware that a change of regime in Iran and ensuing Iraq-like instability would almost inevitably lead to the creation of an independent Kurdistan.

“The Turks know that long after the dust has cleared and the Americans have disappeared over the horizon again, they will be paying for this [collusion in action against Iran] for many years,” an EU diplomat said. “Erdogan is a conservative politician and he will not endanger his country.” [ed.—my emphasis]

If indeed Iran’s influence within Iraq has led to calls for the trifurcation of Iraq which include an independent Kurdistan, Turkey may be feeling some heat.  The Independent Kurdistan movement believes in a Kurdistan which is partially occupied by both Turkey and Iran, and neither nation wants to give up territory to that movement. However, if Iran has close ties with Iraq’s religious Shi’ite majority, Iran may be plotting for a suppression of the Independent Kurdistan movement by enticing a strong Iraqi Shi’ite party to counterbalance that movement within Iraq.  Turkey, a secular Sunni nation, will not register as highly with religious Iran or Southern Iraq.  Iran probably has less to fear from a strong “Southern Kurdistan” (in northern Iraq) than Turkey has to fear.

Iason Athanasiadis also suggests that the U.S. may have solicited Turkey’s aid in attacking Iran by promising Turkey the freedom to attack Kurdish separatists within Iran:

The Turkish press was agog at such goings-on. The respected Milliyet daily argued that Goss and National Intelligence Agency Undersecretary Emre Taner discussed the role played by Turkey in Iraq, as well as the controversial issue of the Kurdish separatist movement PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party).
 
Goss reportedly asked for Turkey’s support against Iran’s nuclear program and warned Ankara that a US air operation against Iran might be in the offing. According to German news agency DDP, Goss assured his Turkish counterparts that they would have a few hours advance warning of an air strike against Iran. He is also said to have given the green light for the Turkish army to strike PKK camps in Iran on the day of the attack.

If true, Goss’s offer is odd and might inspire a backlash from Iraq’s Kurdish population, particularly advocates of a Kurdistan which includes territory currently occupied by Turkey and Iran.  In all likelihood, however, the Independent Kurdistan movement would approve of a U.S.-led attack on Iran, because it has much to gain from a destabilization of Iran — and, its gain may be Turkey’s loss.  In general, then, my sympathy with “Spengler” is inspired by the complex dynamics between the West, Kurdistan, Turkey, and Iran, dynamics which might resolve in greater chaos for the region.  One hopeful sign suggested by both “Spengler” and Iason Athanasiadis, in their respective commentaries, is the broad disapproval in Mideast nations and the EU of a nuclear Iran: there is the hope; but what can be made of it?