MORAL COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ANTI-GLOBALIZATION GUERILLAS: ZenPundit

9/11 and Globalism: Phatic Communion

Flu(n)x: Phatic Communion

A PNM Take on the Riots: Coming Anarchy

Dis-jointed Thoughts: Phatic Communion

Rage: Phatic Communion

Blueprint for Divisiveness: tdaxp

The Borders of our Imagination: ZenPundit

Globalism continues to be a hot topic, with reason. Most of the flux currently being experienced, throughout American society but also worldwide, is a result of the conflict of paradigms brought about by the growing connectivity that slices across these paradigms.

Probably the most common use of the word paradigm is in the sense of weltanschauung. For example, in social science, the term is used to describe the set of experiences, beliefs and values that affect the way an individual perceives reality and responds to that perception. Social scientists have adopted the Khunian phrase “paradigm shift” to denote a particular social phenomena rather than what was originally meant by Khun’s study on the practices and development of science. Even occultists, notably chaos magicians, use the term - to describe a shift in personal belief systems concerning magic (magic theory).

Some language purists feel that among “business philosophers” and advocates of any type of change whatsoever, the term paradigm is so widely abused that it bears no meaning whatsoever. Some believe it should be abolished from the English language, and formal studies of this show it as one of the most disliked words in English.

[Webster’s Online Dictionary: Rosetta Edition]

The looseness of the term paradigm is probably a reflection of something much deeper — as well as the general dislike of the term. Phatic Communion reader Anne suggested in a recent comment on another post a simmering conflict between relativists and moralists, which might account for the flux or at least be a symptom of the flux we are currently experiencing: The looseness of the term is advocated by relativists; the support of strong paradigms (as explanations, motivations) is common among moralists even if they do not use the term.

Controlling, overarching systems either shape society or are shaped by society; or, both. The degree to which we may control the creation of these systems is hotly debated, as is the configuration of whatever systems may be created or modified (if any; extreme relativists and extreme moralists do not seem to believe we can do either.)

For the purpose of this entry, I’ll utilize the term paradigm to signify the various modes by which the world and world events are viewed and explained — although I don’t expect to use the term very much beyond this opening. Suffice to say that

1. Favorite paradigms represent static worldviews, and
2. The current flux occurs because differing paradigms are coming into conflict at a high rate, and
3. Although new paradigms may ultimately form during this process of flux, I will question whether the current flux will or should ultimately resolve into a final paradigm or collection of paradigms. (Although, given my penchant for meandering thought, I might not do so in so many words.)

Flux: a result of the conflict of paradigms brought about by the growing connectivity that slices across these paradigms.

A return to the word, flux.

The term actually comes from the Latin for flow even if it is not always used to denote a flowing environment. The paradox is key. The scientific use of the word often represents a rate of flow of particles or energy; and, the idea that a rate can vary, causing and/or caused by various changes in substance, leads to the common idea of change for the term flux. We may translate this idea for use in understanding world paradigms — or, world views — and the present conflicts brought about through changing rates of connectivity. Various levels of insularity in the past limited the cultural, intellectual, and economic flow between different sets (or, sects) of world views, which in turn led to standardized and accepted modes of interaction, or the flow of these things between the parties. With an increased complexity of interactions, or of networking between parties — or of flow between parties — various paradigmatic elements began to also flow between parties at a greater rate. This has led to a destabilization of static world views. Taking again from the scientific view, we might consider what happens when new data is introduced which conflicts or modifies prior knowledge of a given event or substance: controversies occur at first, then new models are created to account for the new information, and these models persist until another introduction of new and controversial data arrives to upset that model. With greater connectivity between societies (and even, within societies), static world views also undergo such perturbations; and, with the increase in the rate of information being transmitted between societies, the cognition loop of controversy — remodeling — stasis cycles at an increasing rate.

Importantly, when considering whole societies and globalism, we must keep in mind that societies are not homogenous and that the cognition loop not only also happens on an individual level, it happens on multiple fronts for the society as well as the individual. We must also consider the fact that the loop may be interrupted, and that a move from controversy to remodeling, or from remodeling to stasis, or from stasis to controversy, may not occur at a rate corresponding to the general connectivity of the parties. The reason for this is multifaceted:

• Individual resistance may limit the flow of information (cognitive, cultural, economic), producing a stasis in defense of controversy; plus,
• Information tends to work holistically:

  Because of the connectivity of ideas, cultural norms, and economics, the new data which may be incorporated in the remodeling stage might not lead to stasis if some other new data is introduced during the remodeling stage. Remodeling can therefore last for a long time, producing no stasis, or no new paradigm.

  Worse, because of the holistic nature of information, an extreme inundation of new data may lead to levels of controversy which inhibit a move to remodeling: we may not know where to begin our formulation of a new model.

Is it any wonder, then, that the explosion of communications technologies and the increase in international economic connectivity has led to high levels of flux? As Mark Safranski of ZenPundit put it, when considering international borders:

We Americans need to wake up to the nature of the interconnectedness of the globalized world and stop thinking like this was 1955. Borders are no longer walls today. They are revolving doors.

To put it another way and give a small example: The majority of Americans in 1955 considered homosexuality not only a sin, but a psychological defect — and, an oddity which only some people exhibited by choice in the subterranean caverns of the American underground. Leading from 1955, the idea that homosexuality was “on the increase” in American society followed the greater connection of mainstream America to individual homosexuals (via the news, activist groups, publications, and general openness of gays who “came out” to mainstream America.) Previous to this change, mainstream Americans thought that the healthiest way to live — the only real way to live — included heterosexual marriage, often at a young age. The introduction of gay issues and gay identity into mainstream America has led to increased levels of flux which some resist and some welcome: Anti-gay legislation is picking up steam as well as the legalization of gay marriage and civil unions. Nowadays, many heterosexual men do not fear being labeled as “gay” if they pierce their ears or dye their hair, “metrosexuality” has become a passphrase; and, many gays are seeking entry to the “heterosexual” institution of marriage: elements of previously insular paradigms are crossing over between groups. Nonetheless, members of both groups resist the flow, too.

What is important to note: with the introduction of new data, many people often realized that their narrow views of pathways to success are, in fact, narrow. Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam may have seemed exotic to 18th century Americans; but, these faiths have become pathways to spiritual harmony for many modern-day Americans, replacing the Christian mode of finding spiritual peace. Alternatively, many Evangelical Christians have apparently given up on the notion that their faith, missionary work, churches, and televised programs can influence converts to their pathway to spiritual peace and are now turning to the state to force conversion to those pathways: secularism was working (from the evangelical point of view, it was leading to converts to secularism), so why not adopt secular methods?

I have stressed before that the ideas of “connectedness” and “disconnectedness” are vague, perhaps quite inapt —

I also wonder how we measure “connectedness” and “disconnectedness,” since all members of our society are just that: present within the Society. They may be involved in different tasks, different goals with different motivations, but I’m of the same mind with Plato when he asserts that any system of society is a reflection of all the actual members of a society. I.e., we are already connected within the society, even if we don’t always notice the connections or recognize the type of connections that are present. These questions seem paramount, if we are to decide what, exactly, will be taught to the children of our society: what values, what merits, what future.

This slicing of paradigms via connectivity has always occurred, within a society if not always between societies, and is the primary benefactor of the human race. Our ability to formulate ideas, suffer controversies, and reformulate ideas is the root of our success on this planet. It is the learning process; and, when it occurs between individuals, it often produces the best results: for seeing outside the box, another independent agent can be key.

This slicing is also often the root of war. To the degree that ideas shape motivations and are expressed in power projections — or, by actual acts — the advancement of world views can be seen in the physical results: productivity and the control of resources, social power, military expansion, economic enterprises, and the like. Success in these areas often leads to a stabilization of the world views which appear to have led to these successes. Heresy must be squelched when alternative pathways to success threaten to upset such a status quo — Why fix what isn’t broken? I.e., the fear of those who have benefited from the status quo is that the system may deteriorate and the pathways which keep it running might be blocked or otherwise destroyed if attempts to “fix” it are allowed. At the same time, if competing world views are allowed an opportunity to flourish, their results might prove far superior to the results of the old status quo; then, the supporters of the new system, who are the primary recipients of the benefits of that new system, might gain the reins of power once held by supporters of the old status quo. —At least, this is the sort of fear which often leads to violent conflict. Most people are not willing to learn from an entirely free “survival of the fittest” approach, in which systems of world views are allowed to flourish together, and would rather change the rules by which the contest is determined: out of fear of annihilation, or of lost status, they subvert the competing system of world views or bypass it with a system of physical power projection. They do not allow views to compete, but make use of physics for determining which world view will endure; a dead man can hold no views, an imprisoned man can spread no views, and thus ideas are squelched.

In a bureaucratic state, or a “civilized” society, laws may sometimes be advanced which elevate certain views above other views. Usually, these laws depend on the threat of physical force for their success or else offer economic incentives — which are really threats of physical force. The denial of economic aid when such aid is being given elsewhere is an effort to upset the physical environment of the parties involved, in favor of one over another. Subsidies no doubt relieve a recipient of potential physical harm, such as starvation or destitution, while promoting a view of the world dependent on such aid and the threat of its denial.

Such methods for determining the superiority of proposed truths — or of advancing a view of reality — can sometimes elevate erroneous views, or falsehoods.

Who determines the success or failure of a system? This question is often debated, and the answer will determine the long-term stability of the system and whether war occurs.

We are currently witnessing, on the world stage, such a debate. Or rather, such debates — because the focus is diffuse. Islamist militants do not wish for American-style democracy to flourish in the Middle East, but neither does China wish for that type of democracy to flourish within its borders, preferring what it calls “socialist democracy.” When the democratically elected leaders of Spain chose to withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq, staunch American proponents of democracy derided the “cowardly” populace of Spain: democracy would be the cure in the Middle East, but became the disease in Spain. George W. Bush’s efforts in Iraq would have been so much simpler if democratic France and democratic Germany had followed his lead without question, as one obeys one’s master — and democratic France has recently discovered that its ideals of fraternity and citizenship were not at all what they believed.

The focus also touches upon Hugo Chavez, democratically elected leader of Venezuela, who dares to oppose U.S. intentions; Mark Safranski of ZenPundit looks at Chavez:

In my opinion, neither Morales nor Chavez are democrats except in the same nominal sense as Slobodan Milosevic -i.e. participating in a democratic electoral system only to the extent that they can maximize outcomes for themselves. Chavez is a former putschist and Morales toppled two democratically elected governments with street demonstrations; the only democratic scenarios these guys respect are the elections that their side wins. At best, Morales and Chavez are illiberal populists and the only intelligent aspect of a generally hapless U.S. policy toward Venezuela has been not providing Chavez with an anti-yankee pretext to formally seize absolute power.

One must wonder why “populism” in a democratic election is to be feared; the irony is pungent. Also, protest and revolution have in the past led favorably to the formation of a democratic leadership, as we well know. Is it any wonder that liberal American pundits question U.S. hostility toward Chavez? But look at the riots in France: while deriding the internal latent racism (or else, mere hypocrisy) of the French system, some conservative pundits also warn against the spreading intifida of Muslim youths there! We must also remember that America was a democracy while slavery flourished south of the Mason-Dixon line. So I do not discredit Mark’s look at Chavez and the processes which put Chavez in power and keep him there, especially because a closer look seems so necessary when the issues of democracy and globalization are still fuzzy in our minds. Mark continues:

The challenge of the alternative economic model Chavez and Morales represent America has seen before, though not for some time, in the form of state -directed capitalism of fascist and quasi-fascist states during the 1930’s and 1940’s, including Peron’s Argentina and managed trade type barter agreements pioneered by Hjalmar Schacht. Essentially, it is an anti-free market policy designed to control currency reserves ( back then we would have said gold) for the regime’s import priorities and allow the state to exert control over the direction of the economy without the responsibility of total state ownership ( though Chavez may go in that direction in time).

[Whereas, I suppose, China does the same thing, only with the responsibility of total state ownership — but not in every industry.]

Without getting hung up on labels and arguments over Left-Right terminology, this is a quasi-autarkic policy designed to produce short term economic results for the regime and hold the effects of globalization at bay.

[What are these “effects of globalization”? China’s tango with Latin America goes both ways, it would seem, as cultural elements stream between China and its trading partners in Latin America, which seems like one effect of globalization actually occurs….]

It worked for about six years in the case of Nazi Germany and yielded a prodigious rearmament program before the internal contradictions of Schacht’s program brought the German economy to the breaking point - at which time Hitler’s gamble for a limited war with Poland resulted in WWII.

[Nazi Germany didn’t have an ascendent China for a trading partner, although it had a rising Japan. But to my knowledge (limited as it is) Japan had not already begun the sort of broad, economic outreach which China now has. Even China’s economic ties with the U.S. make it a stabilizing economic force for Venezuela. I think that predictions of Venezuelan demise — particularly, given Venezuela’s oil supply — cannot be founded on an analogy with Nazi Germany. On the other hand, Chavez might seek to broaden his reach in South America in the way Japan sought to broaden its reach in China…And, China’s own economic outlook might sour if “the internal contradictions” of Chinese society are not ironed out. I expect them to be ironed out, however.]

This updated and far less coherent anti-gringo version of Schacht’s econmic wizardry runs against an American policy for a freer world of global trade dating back to The Atlantic Charter.

So, from a certain perspective, Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez and Osama bin Laden are all anti-Globalization warriors using different means toward the same end - a world of politically sealed fiefdoms with only slender threads of connectivity to the outside world being allowed by local oligarchies.

I doubt the metaphor being used here: “only slender threads of connectivity.” For one, the thread to China is not likely to be thin. In seeking a counter to American hegemony (as it is often called in China), China will broaden its ties to Venezuela. Moreover, China’s own efforts at connectivity, such as the SCO and APSCO, will work as a conduit for Chavez and Morales of Bolivia and others in the region.

Even given the levels of connectivity spinning out of China, and assuming a growing system of spokes from that hub, we’d be remiss if we considered these to be a symptom of globalization as it is normally conceived. Rather, we might be witnessing a bi-polar development: the formation of two primary blocs of power, with the U.S. and China as two interconnecting hubs, rather than free-flowing connectivity on a global free market scale. Mark also is right to question the internal connectivity of the Venezuelan populace as a measure of Venezuelan long-term success:

While the nationalist, anti-Western and anti-American demogogy will be about sovereignty and evil multinational corporations, the concealed reality has mostly to do with political mafias of iron-hearted men keeping their own people ignorant and shackled.

It is the same argument used against China and Iran: Will “internal contradictions” lead to economic collapse? We have been waiting for such to happen in North Korea, have seen it happen to the Soviet Union, and perhaps wonder why it hasn’t happened yet in China and Iran.

The proponents and opponents of globalization often fail to account for the whole globe:

Connectivity means

1. Being connected to the U.S. in the way the U.S. wishes to connect, only; or


2. A free-flow of information, trade, and cooperation between states, with no state dominating the process; or


3. Perhaps the domineering corporatization of all world commerce under the guidance of transnational corporations.

The first assumes U.S. superiority — the U.S. will be the shepherd of the wandering flock. The proponents of globalization who have this view believe either in the infallibility of the U.S. system or else recognize its imperfections but nonetheless believe the U.S. system is the best system currently in operation. The opponents resist the top-down model, are “global guerillas” or autocratic entities wishing to maintain a greater level of self-determination than proposed by the U.S. or by a SysAdmin force not of their choosing. (Chavez.) China also opposes this globalist paradigm, although as a potential new hub might willingly substitute itself for the U.S. in this model. (As would al Qaeda.)

The second is characteristic of the multiculturalist elite of America and also possibly the greatest foreign supporters of the U.N. (I.e., those who are not simply into the U.N. for lucrative deals, such as the oil-for-food scammers) Supporters of this paradigm are those who actually believe in an equal standing for all nations and all ideologies, who also therefore tend to be relativists. The opponents of this globalist paradigm are therefore the moralists, including supporters of the first globalist paradigm (above.) Possibly, China belongs here, is a supporter of this paradigm more than the other, if Hu Jintao’s statements to this effect can be believed:

“In the spirit of equality and openness, we should safeguard the diversity of civilization, promote the democratization of international relations, concert our efforts to construct a harmonious world that embraces all kinds of civilization.” (previously quoted on Phatic Communion, here.)

The third has no overt supporters, to my knowledge, but many opponents. Demonstrations against the WTO are symptomatic of opposition to this paradigm. Possibly, some corporate boardrooms contain supporters of this globalist paradigm; and, I would not be surprised if that were the case. Still, they are likely to work through state departments, thus ultimately blurring the distinction between the first two above on their path to success.

The reason these three globalists views fail to account for the whole globe is simply that other forces are not allowed into their globalist equations: gaps are included with the globalist schemes. Gaps are actually created in the establishment of these globalist schemes. To put it another way, the “box” models are not spherical (global), and proponents of each operate within the box of their own paradigms.

By asserting U.S. supremacy in the equation, supporters of the first tend to disregard whatever world views stand in the way or appear to counter or question U.S. models. At the same time, it is the fear of a top-down system which inspires opponents of such globalism.

Similarly, even the second paradigm finds opponents — supporters of the first paradigm who believe that the U.S. model is best and do not desire an imposition from non-democratic or non-capitalist societies. (These non-terms are viewed through the particular prism of U.S. definitions of those root terms. Thus, European democracies are seen to be failures, and the Chinese concept of “socialist democracy” is dismissed out of hand.) To the extent that international multiculturalists would include despotic regimes equally with democratic regimes, they would exclude many individuals from their form of “connectivity.”

Whatever proponents of the third paradigm exist are sure to attempt to absorb or destroy competing corporations, to set prices worldwide, and even perhaps control the access of resources and products to these ends; they, too, are sure to be opposed.

And, for the stabilization of a globalization of affairs, all three dismiss individual players, operate at the state or transnational level and thus fail to develop system-wide integrity. This is a central failing of each. The push for connectivity between states in an effort to achieve international cooperation via the shrinking of “the Gap” nonetheless disregards the gaps within nations. Holes will still exist, and the superempowerment of individuals only requires a handful of disaffected individuals to perturb the system — possibly in catastrophic ways. As mentioned, the second of the globalist paradigms above fails to account for individual self-determination: multiculturalism, expressed in such a relativistic international manner, would allow the participation of states which are not democratic by nature. Thus al Qaeda would still recruit from within a connected Saudi Arabia or a connected Jordan. One might wonder why the first plan for globalization — U.S. engineered globalism — also fails this test. But we can look at France, as Chirol did on Coming Anarchy, for a clue to the answer:

Instead of concentrating on the specifics here, think back to the basic Core/Gap theory and the blueprint for action needed to connect these areas and keep them connected. Instead of thinking of poverty or radical Islam as problems, think of them as symptoms for disconnectedness. France needs to take a hard line jailing and deporting who they can, but at the end of the day, their job is to connect these ghettos and like Barnett said, the boys aren’t coming home. Granted we aren’t talking about soldiers here, but his point stands that a sustained effort over a long period of time will be necessary to increase the “flows” and ultimately connect France’s gap.

The idea is somewhat in alignment with dis-jointed thoughts I once proposed on Phatic Communion, which I will now join with Chirol’s:

I think those others, gay or straight, who do not have a healthy vision of The Future, despair in the same way [as I once did]. But I do not approve of many of the so-called “connected” — who similarly do not have a healthy vision of the future, because they often fail to include their so-called “disconnected” neighbors, and those neighbors will be going into the future with them

This is also why I must take issue with Dan’s interpretation on tdaxp of one aspect of Thomas Barnett’s “Blueprint for Action.” Quoting Barnett —

While Old Core Europe and Japan are more than a little bit tempted by Osama bin Laden’s offer of civilizational apartheid, both the United States and the New Core pillars understand what a false promise this truly is. America instinctively rejects the offer because, as citizens of the world’s free multinational economic and political union, we simply can’t accept the notion of a world thus divided. As a society blended from all civilizations, the very notion of such separatism is simply repulsive to our citizenry. For if such cultural apartheid really made sense, most of American history would have unfolded in vain — the Civil War, the suffragist movement, organized labor, civil rights, gay rights, and so on.

— Dan calls it “Blueprint for Divisiveness.” He likes what he has read in Barnett’s passage, but not all.

I was very happy with the passage.

With the exception of the last half of the last quoted sentence.

Ultimately, I replaced it with:

For if such cultural apartheid really made sense, most of American history would have unfolded in vain — the Civil War, democracy, civil rights, and so on.

Keeping Dr. Barnett’s original list, especially “gay rights,” would have distracted the issue away from his vision of “shrinking the Gap” and “ending war as we know it” to divisive and petty domestic concerns.

Dan’s reasoning is, in a nutshell, this: We can’t reasonably expect to entice homophobic nations into increased connectivity with the U.S. if we list “homosexual rights” as one of our core values. Of course, the issue of whether gay rights is an American value is itself open to dispute. But the assertion that the issue is a “petty” concern is indicative of the gap-producing type of globalist paradigm mentioned above. I.e., for gay men and lesbians and their families, the concern is not at all petty; but the globalist designs of some would disregard it for the sake of expediency. I addressed the subject in a post titled “Rage” (to which Dan recently responded) —

My rage comes from reading ultrapatriotic right-wing blogs, the words of Freedom Thumpers, who mince over every suggestion that America does anything but bring Freedom to the world while ignoring the great disservice America renders to its gay and lesbian citizens — or who, in fact, wail over and bemoan the “threat” of homosexuality.

My rage comes from witnessing the lies and violence committed in the name of “Freedom” by those who know nothing of freedom, the vehemence and patriotic zeal of those who would export what they cannot — or, will not — bring to their own nation.

My rage is not the type of rage that will seek outlet in instigating riots, or committing murder or acts of terrorism, or, now, in self-destructive behavior. Yet many in this American Gap might do these things, particularly self-destruct. A lack of connectivity, of feeling equal relevance within a system, produces opponents to that system; and, self-destructive behaviors by individuals within a system — such as drug abuse and financial insolvency — inhibit the overall economic success of the entire system. Current moves to ban gay marriage and continuing efforts to allow the discrimination against gays in the workforce are moves to institutionalize long-sustained gaps — a reaction against the greater connectivity of gays within American society — and are thus not terribly different in motive from the isolationist reactions of some state leaders or the terrorist groups who seek world dominance in order to avert the influences which come with globalization. They are the establishment of an exclusionary status quo which benefits most those who support that status quo.

There is something pitiful in a globalist plan that seeks increased international connectivity while disregarding internal gaps. France is learning the lesson. With Katrina, the U.S. was forced to witness other gaps. (Some of which were merely operational, between levels of government; others, economic.) We might be thankful that the U.S. does not have the same problem France has, push forward in trying to connect the rest of the world according to American designs, and fail to see that our own internal gaps are leaving us open to attacks domestic or foreign. Peaceful global connectivity will require a more fundamental and complex connectivity than the treaties printed on paper or the free flow of economic trade between nations. It will include connecting individuals within nations as well as between nations, of the entire world. A globalist policy which disregards this fact by operating merely on the international level — i.e., at the state level — is doomed to failure because special interests will continue to seek dominance through majoritarian and/or economic means within nations and violent opposition to these forces will continue to simmer underneath the veneer of majoritarian or national “unity” — if even such a semblance of unity can be achieved.